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This is an asymmetrical, multi-matrix war. It is a war
defined by complex intrigue, shifting alliances, mutating motivations,
chronic bribery, remotely-generated civilian deaths, insuperable
barriers of language and ethnic and subtribal conflicts. It is fought by
warlords, militias, criminal gangs, and special forces discretionary
death squads. Millions of civilians are impoverished, terrified and live
with violent disruptions. There is no central government to speak of.
The White House uses illusions of strategies and tactics to bid for
time. In Afghanistan, the historic graveyard of invaders, hope springs
infernal.
Neatly dressed Generals—who probably would never
have gotten into this mess if they, not the civilian neocon, draft
dodgers in the Bush regime, had made the call—regularly trudge up to
Congress to testify. There they caveat their status reports, keeping
expectations alive, while cowardly politicians praise their bravery.
General David Petraeus could receive the Academy Award in Hollywood next
year, as long as he doesn’t say what he really thinks, obedient
soldier that he is. Listen to General Stanley A. McChrystal, not known
for his squeamishness. Speaking of civilian deaths and injured at
military checkpoints, he said: “We have shot an amazing number of
people, but to my knowledge, none have ever proven to be a threat.”
On the ground are 100,000 U.S. soldiers with another
100,000 corporate contractors. The human and economic costs are huge.
According to the CIA, James Jones—Obama’s national security
adviser—and other officials, there are only 50 to 100 Al Qaeda
operatives in Afghanistan and 300 to 400 members of the group in
Pakistan. The rest have scattered to other nations or just melded back
into the population. Affiliates of Al Qaeda have emerged in the southern
Arabian peninsula, Somalia, North Africa, Indonesia and other locales.
There is something awry about this asymmetry.
The Taliban number no more the 30,000 irregular
fighters of decidedly mixed motivations entirely focused over there, not
toward the U.S. mainland. President Obama describes the Taliban as “a
blend of hard-core ideologues, tribal leaders, kids that basically sign
up because it’s the best job available to them. Not all of them are
going to be thinking the same way about the Afghan government, about the
future of Afghanistan. And so we’re going to have to sort through how
these talks take place.”
Helping Obama “sort through” are drones blowing up
civilian gatherings—by mistake of course—to destroy suspected
militants often casually chosen by other natives because of grudges or
the transfer of money. Helicopter gunships and fighter planes spread
havoc and terror through the populace. “Special forces” go deeper
into Pakistan with their secret missions of mayhem. Local resentment and
anger continues to boomerang against the U.S. occupiers.
U.S. Army truckloads of hundred dollar bills are
paying off various personages of uncertain reliability. At the same
time, Obama’s representatives regularly accuse President Karzai of
rampant corruption. In between, civilian Americans and USAID try to dig
wells and construct clinics and schools that might not be there very
long in the anarchic, violent, nightfall world of the Afghan tribal
areas.
More military force is expected to clear the way for
the assumption of Afghan-run duties and security in 2014 by a central
government that is neither central, nor governmental. The locals loath
the government’s attempt to collect taxes, and continue to survive by
growing poppies (opium).
In early 2001, George W. Bush awarded the Taliban $40
million for stamping out the poppy trade; now Afghanistan is the number
one narco grower in the world. U.S. soldiers walk right past the poppy
fields so as not to turn the locals against them.
U.S. dollars pay warlords and the Taliban in order for
them not to blow up U.S. conveys going through mountain passes, some
carrying fuel that costs taxpayers $400 per delivered gallon. The
Taliban receive half the electricity from a U.S. built power plant and
collect the monthly electric bills in their controlled areas. The more
electricity, the more money for the Taliban to fight the American and
British soldiers.
Last year, over three billion dollars in cash moved
out of Kabul’s airport unaccounted for, while billions of US dollars
flow into Kabul for undocumented purposes.
Despite fighting against “insurgents” possessing
rifles, propelled grenades and suicide vests, the Obama
administration—with an arsenal of massive super-modern weaponry at
hand—keeps saying there is no military solution and that only a
political settlement will end the conflict.
Tell that to the Afghan people, who suffer from brutal
sectarian struggles fueled by American and coalition occupiers and
invaders. To them, there’s a disconnect between what Obama does and
what he says he wants.
Meanwhile, the war spills ever more into Pakistan and
its turbulent politics generates more hatred against Americans. These
people had nothing to do with 9/11 so why, they ask, are the Americans
blowing up their neighborhood?
President Obama says the soldiers should start coming
home in July 2011, depending on conditions on the ground. He wants the
Taliban commanders, whom he is destroying one by one, to agree to
negotiations with Kabul that requires their subservience. His formula is
peace through more war. But the Taliban are not known to surrender. They
know the terrain where they live and they believe they can wear Obama
down, notwithstanding U.S. special forces and drones expected to stay
there for years.
Congress—an inkblot so far—needs to assert its
constitutional authority over budgets and policy toward the war. Members
are regular rubber-stamps of White House recklessness under Bush and
Obama.
Furthermore, nothing will happen without a few million
Americans back home stomping, marching and bellowing to end the
boomeranging, costly invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and concentrate
on America’s needs at home.
Ralph Nader
is a consumer advocate,
lawyer, and author. His most recent book - and first novel - is, Only
The Super-Rich Can Save Us. His most recent work of non-fiction is The
Seventeen Traditions.
[Source:
CounterCurrents.org]
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