The latest Western move in Afghanistan, born out of the desire to start pulling out troops from mid-2011, is based on an erroneous assumption that a resurgent Taliban will fall for allurement and abandon their goal of re-taking the country, which they think is achievable. The disarray in the camp of the United States and its allies and US President Barack Obama’s reluctant decision on a short-term surge of some 40,000 more soldiers, is far too evident to be missed by Taliban in the battlefield and their patron, Pakistan, which has flatly refused to evict Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents from its tribal areas after a show of military action in Swat and south Waziristan that led to the insurgents moving to safer areas without losing many fighters.

President Hamid karzai, sullen and soured with the US that understandably wants to get rid of him, is in no position to resist the new strategy but insists that only those Taliban will be pardoned who do not belong to Al Qaeda, join the mainstream and work within the democratic Afghan constitution. He is being repeatedly insulted by parliament, which has so far refused to approve the full complement of his Cabinet ministers, forcing him to administer oaths in instalments -- there still being a dozen vacancies to be filled.

A hasty US withdrawal will spell disaster for war-ravaged Afghanistan and pose a grave threat to regional security and stability. India, which is fully involved in Afghanistan’s reconstruction -- which is disliked by Taliban and openly objected to by Pakistan -- will face increased terrorist threat once Taliban and Al Qaeda somehow manage to take control of the country.

US special representative Richard Holbrooke argued the new reconciliation policy is solely guided by the consideration to prevent further American and other casualties. An opportunity was being offered to get the shooters off the field so that they do not kill soldiers and civilians. Last year was the worst so far for the foreign soldiers and Afghan civilians -- with the highest casualties so far. US officials believe that the majority of Taliban forces do not back Al Qaeda or embrace extremist goals, nor are they ideological supporters of Mulla Omar or Osama Bin Laden. At least 70 per cent of them are not fighting for any of the causes and majority of the people blame Taliban, and not the US forces, for their misery.

Yet, there are “red lines” that could not be crossed during negotiations with Taliban fighters and those who back Al Qaeda or support the group’s harsh treatment of women, would not be recommended. By making them stop fighting future casualties would be prevented. There still is no clearly defined plan on reconciliation and reintegration of the Taliban within the establishment. In a sign of how serious the West has become, the United Nations removed five top Taliban commanders from its sanctions list to facilitate reconciliation.

These include former foreign minister Abdul Wakil Muttawakil, former deputy Foreign Minister Faiz Mohammed Faizan, an official under the Taliban Shams-us-Safa and Mohammad Musa. They were under travel ban and assets freeze. In the initial stages of the war, the US and Pakistan had tried to utilise the services of Muttawakil to argue with the Taliban leadership to halt all military action and agree to reconciliation. But his efforts did not bear fruit and the Taliban leadership refused to negotiate with the US and its allies. Mulla Omar has repeatedly said that attempts to divide the Taliban would not succeed and that peace was possible on the condition that all foreign forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan and the people allowed to choose for themselves the form of government they wanted, without any outside interference. There are no indications so far that Omar and his associates have changed their stand.

In the changed policy of the US, Pakistan sees an opportunity -- to reassert its influence in shaping the future set up in Afghanistan after foreign forces have withdrawn in a couple of years. Islamabad supports a differentiation between Taliban segments, including being soft towards the Afghan Taliban, which was sponsored by Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Intelligence.

 A-vast majority of the Afghan do not want the Taliban back and their country being pushed again into the dark ages. But little security is available to them. The risk of Taliban retribution is so great that few are prepared actively to resist the insurgents. Hence the need to deal with hardcore Taliban militarily and defeat them, while simultaneously building effective governance, providing security to the people, intensifying reconstruction and strengthening secular and democratic institutions. There is also need for a regional agreement to ensure peace and neutrality in Afghanistan after foreign forces have left.