His left wing critics are sorely disappointed that much of what they expected would have been achieved by now has not happened:

The military prison at Guantanamo has not yet been closed. No indictments have been sought against members of the Bush-Cheney Administration suspected of sponsoring torture. The U.S. remains at war. Wall Street has not been disciplined. Unemployment remains high. Health care legislation has been slowed down. Climate change legislation is stuck. Developments in Afghanistan are one more irritant.

RETALIATION

The war in Afghanistan was launched in retaliation for the massacre of September 11, 2001. When Osama bin Laden, leader of Al Qaeda, triumphantly took credit for that attack, the U.S. Senate authorized military action against Al Qaeda by a vote of 98 to zero. In the House of Representatives the vote was 420 to 1. That authorization remains in force.

Also in force is NATO’s invocation of Article 5 of its charter which holds that an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. Similarly, the UN Security Council has endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks.

The war was commended when it was launched, as a “war of necessity.” The “feel good” mood increased substantially when U.S. forces drove both the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan (and into the border areas of Pakistan). The fact that the top leaders of both groups were at large did not seem to matter.

Then BushCheney changed course. They decided to pour men and materiel into Iraq “to die for a lie.” According to Secretary of State Colin Powell’s deputy, Richard Armitage: “The war in Iraq drained resources from Afghanistan before things were under control. And we never recovered. We never looked back.”

In that context Obama pledged (on August 1, 2007) that as president he would “deploy at least two additional brigades to Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO's efforts against the Taliban."

SETBACKS

Two years later, on Aug. 30, 2009, faced with continuing military setbacks, and realizing that Afghanistan was engulfed in political, social, and economic deterioration, General Stanley McChrystal, commander of NATO and U.S. forces, pressed the case for a new strategy and additional resources.

He cautioned that “failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure.”

This grim warning caused the Obama administration to stop in its tracks and conduct an “agonizing reappraisal” of its options. The result, after 92 days of intense consultations, was a decision by Nobel peace laureate Obama to increase U.S. troop strength, and to seek additional troops from NATO allies as well. At the same time, however, he stressed that a draw down of U. S. troops would begin in 2011 with responsibilities being progressively handed over to the Afghans.

The ultimate goal, Obama said, is unchanged: “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”

The 92 days of deliberate and deliberative introspection were derided by Obama’s conservative critics, who would have preferred him to rush thousands of young people, Afghans and Americans, into bloody confrontation.

It is worth noting, however, that when Obama addressed U.S. troops some weeks ago his biggest applause line was the assurance that he would not be rushed into a decision on Afghanistan.

And then there are those words of wisdom from Thomas Jefferson: “Delay is preferable to error.”

The men and women preparing for deployment in Afghanistan will obviously hope that the plan which Obama rolled out in a 34-minute address at the famed West Point on Tuesday, Dec. 1, is wisdom without error.

SECURITY

What is missing from all the huffing and puffing and planning is a full blown national debate -- inclusive and transparent -– on whether excluding Al Qaeda and its abettor the Taliban from Afghanistan is an essential pre-requisite for protecting and preserving America’s national security.

Every nation has a right and obligation to defend itself from attacks aimed at its eventual destruction. An acknowledged superpower is perhaps more likely to exercise that right, because if it is repeatedly shown up as vulnerable it will eventually lose its standing as a superpower.

The 9/11 massacre demonstrated serious weaknesses in U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and security. An Asian American commented at the time: “Customs won’t allow me to bring in a bottle of pickles when I return from vacation but these guys were able to coolly hijack whole aircraft and take control of our skies.”

Al Qaeda and its leaders were known to be headquartered in Afghanistan at the time so it made military sense to remove it from its haven and topple its enablers from power. But now?

Al Qaeda-inspired attacks have taken place in Indonesia, Spain, the U.K. and elsewhere since its havens in Afghanistan were emptied. What is to prevent Al Qaeda from taking its operation to, say, Somalia, Yemen, or any other friendly state if it is denied entry to Afghanistan as a result of intensified NATO/U.S. vigilance?

A national, or even international debate, might have provided answers to these and related questions. For the present, the world has to be satisfied with Obama’s explanation: “If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.”

CONSULTATION

That being the case, is it a strategic error for NATO/U.S. plans to be put in place without adequate local consultation? Undoubtedly, it is difficult for foreign visitors who do not speak local languages to launch such consultations. There are, however, NGOs and others whose services might have been coopted.

Instead, collaboration with the local population is “top down,” based on “partnership” with those now in power: the government of President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan and of President Asif Ali Zardari in Pakistan. Both regimes, unfortunately, are wobbly.

Karzai has been told that he cannot depend on blank cheques any longer -- who knew that he was receiving them until now? -- and that he needs to purge his government of corruption, inefficiency, etc. Can he undertake that task?

Here is the view of Ambassador Peter Galbraith who was the UN secretary general’s deputy special representative in Afghanistan until he shone a revealing light on election fraud and lost his position thereafter: "It's clear that a fraud-tainted Karzai government, considered illegitimate by a large part of the country, cannot fulfill the role of a reliable partner.

“And thus, although the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in 2009, as it has every year since 2004, in my view sending additional troops is no answer. Without a credible Afghan partner, they cannot accomplish their mission and sending them is, therefore, a poor use of a valuable resource."

To secure Pakistan’s collaboration, Obama has offered that country a partnership “built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust.” Some Pakistanis believe that Zardari might not hold office long enough to enjoy the fruits of partnership. Moreover, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton found during her recent visit to Pakistan, suspicion of U.S. policies runs deep and wide.

SUPPORT

Despite these snags, there has been support for the new moves.

A poll conducted by the newspaper “USA Today” after Obama announced his new Afghanistan strategy found that the public approves the move by a margin of 51-40 percent. However, by a 3-1 margin Americans worry that the costs might make it more difficult for domestic economic problems to be solved.

NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that the organization would commit 7000 additional troops to the coalition in Afghanistan.

Karl Eikenberry, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan said that Obama’s decisions “provide clarity and focus to the U.S. mission.”

McChrystal commended the “clarity, commitment and resolve outlined in the president's address” as critical steps toward bringing security to Afghanistan and eliminating terrorist safe havens that threaten regional and global security.

A statement from the Afghan Interior Ministry said: “That kind of time frame will give us momentum. We are hoping that there will be clarity in terms of long-term growth needs of the Afghan national security forces and what can be achieved in 18 months.”
A Pakistan Foreign Ministry statement said that “Pakistan looks forward to engaging closely with [the] U.S in understanding the full import of the new strategy and to ensure that there would be no adverse fallout on Pakistan.”

Not surprisingly, Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahamdi struck a different note. He warned: Obama will witness lots of coffins heading to America from Afghanistan. Their hope to control Afghanistan by military means will not become reality. The extra 30,000 troops that will come to Afghanistan will provoke stronger resistance and fighting. They will withdraw shamefully. They cannot achieve their hopes and goals.”

TIME

McChrystal is on record as believing that to achieve success (however defined) in Afghanistan, his team and he could benefit from humility. His military boss, Gen. David Petraeus, who was recently quoted by “Parade “ magazine as observing that U.S. forces would be in Afghanistan even a decade hence, said that what they needed most was time.

Perhaps he should acquaint himself with the words of a Taliban member, as reported by American academic Seth G. Jones, in his admirable “In the Graveyard of Empires, America’s War in Afghanistan.”

Jones writes: “You have the watches,” one Taliban detainee told his American interrogators, “but we have the time.”

[Source: IDN-InDepthNews | Analysis That Matters]

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The writer has served as Sri Lanka's ambassador to Canada, Cuba, Mexico, and the USA. He was Chairman of the Commonwealth's Select Committee on the media and development.