In other words, the Maoist party, if it is to retain credibility, has to create conditions whereby this population gains a sense of a participation in public affairs under the leadership of the party. This is not an easy task; it certainly cannot be accomplished through normal democratic procedure. During normal periods of rule, the chasm between rulers and ruled is deep. Systems of everyday democratic citizenship – procedures to ensure accountability and transparency – have not been institutionalized. Parliamentary debate, which in established democracies offers the opposition the opportunity to channel public participation, cannot capture mass sentiment in this country. Besides, the other parties have blocked all attempts by the Maoists to discuss in the legislature the circumstances surrounding their ejection from power, thus thwarting the use of legitimate channels to express the party’s grievances and denounce the government.

Then again, the nature of the political system is such that the majority of the nation’s inhabitants are able to transcend subjecthood to gain a sense of citizenship only during extraordinary circumstances: during elections and during mass movements that achieve enough critical mass to topple dictatorial regimes. Only during the mass catharsis of such times does the public feel that it is part of and influencing public events.
By organizing protests to pressure the government into giving into their demands, the Maoists have tried to simulate the mass mobilization and the feeling of involvement in public affairs prevalent during truly mass movements and elections. But certain crucial conditions prevalent during such extraordinary circumstances cannot be simulated by protests and rallies alone. Unlike elections, these protests do not culminate in a specific event that will reveal the precise balance of forces between parties. Unlike mass movements against dictatorial regimes, the visceral excitement of bringing the opponent down does not exist in a rally. This is where the general strike – whereby, through organized force, the agitating party is able to ensure that all activity in urban and semi-urban areas is brought to a total halt – becomes necessary as a tactic. Its successful imposition is an indication that the government is ineffective in countering it and that the agitating party possesses an excess of both strength and will. The general strike simulates the public sensation that occurs in extraordinary times that the agitating party can use its strength on the streets to undermine its rivals.

The primary understanding here is that the public respects force. By ensuring a total shut down of the capital and all urban areas in the country, the Maoists were demonstrating the strength and reach of their organizational body. Force evokes awe, and the degree of awe that the masses feel is proportionate to how militantly the strike is enforced. It is thus necessary, before a strike is announced, to ensure that the party possesses the organizational strength to enforce it. The day of the strike, there will generally be caution in the early morning and phone calls regarding the feasibility of movement will be exchanged across town. A few people will take out motorcycles to see how far they can go. And if they are able to reach their destinations without getting beaten up or having their vehicles vandalized, the news will quickly spread and increasing numbers of vehicles will be seen on the streets. Any respect that the public may have for the organizing party will morph into contempt. For it will be known that any weakness in the imposition of a strike is because the organizing party lacks the required cadre base to impose it, or that its street-level workers are anarchic and unreceptive to instructions.

The successful general strike, however, has its dangers and needs to be used in a carefully calibrated manner. There is some truth to the conventional argument that disruption to daily life only builds resentment among and alienates the public. This is particularly so when the agitating parties immediate demand to the government is seen to be narrow and self-serving. In the general perception, this is still the case with the Maoist demand for the restoration of “civilian supremacy.” The argument they have presented regarding the matter involves convoluted constitutional specifics that is not easily understood; it is thus widely perceived as simply a ploy that the Maoists have used to undermine the government and eventually return to power.
In order to cultivate mass support then, the party has to broaden the framework of struggle. Demands that have a wider social impact (as opposed to the merely political) have to be presented. This is what was behind the Maoists decision to, at different stages in their movement, demand that land be provided to the landless or employment to the unemployed or autonomous provinces to ethnic groups.

Even this, however, does not wholly ensure that the general strike will not alienate the public. The demonstration of force to shut down all activity, as mentioned arouses awe, but by itself it, instead of translating into mass support, leads to feelings of intimidation and harassment. This may be sufficient during times such as armed struggle when the objective is to totally incapacitate the state and bring it down. And indeed the Maoists, in a demonstration of their power, blockaded Kathmandu to great effect during the last years of the war. But in a situation like the present, where the objective is not to totally delegitimize the state but to make it receptive to addressing specific demands, and for which it is necessary to create public opinion in the Maoists’ favour, it is necessary, at some stage during the strike to channel the tension generated by the strike through a spectacle that will allow for mass release. So on the third day of the strike called by the Maoists on 20 December, thousands of people flocked to New Baneshwor where they were allowed the treat of dancing to “revolutionary” songs performed by the Maoists’ cultural wing. The top leaders of the party then came onto stage to deliver speeches where they roused the crowd with their rhetoric. Having just witnessed the successful three-day imposition of force that demonstrated the strength of the party and the inability of the government to do anything about it, there was created in the mind of the crowd the illusion of participation in a mass struggle regarding matters of fundamental national importance.

But those present at the rally constituted only a tiny fraction of the population, the vast majority of which continues to remain political apathetic and cynical towards the Maoists’ immediate motives. So finally, to address this constituency, the agitating party needs to take a long-term view and persevere with the slogans they have raised. Experience has demonstrated to the Maoists that demands which initially appear to the public to be foolhardy or unfeasible can in fact be through sheer persistence brought into reality – the elections to the Constituent Assembly is one such example. And so the constant repetition of the slogan for “civilian supremacy” may similarly eventually bring the military under the control of an elected government. If the Maoists do succeed in that aim, the inconvenience caused by the general strike will by then be forgotten and – regardless of whether one agrees with the outcome– it will instead be remembered as a phase in a genuine political struggle.