The Army announced a round of recruitment in November 2008; the Defence Minister asked them to halt it, claiming it violated the comprehensive peace accord; the Army Chief clarified that they had recruited to fill existing positions earlier as well, and went ahead with the process. The Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) retaliated and announced its own recruitment. The case went to the Supreme Court, where a Government and its own Army battled it out. The Supreme Court ordered the PLA to halt recruitment immediately, and Nepal Army (NA), not to recruit in the future. This was followed soon after by the refusal of the Government to extend the terms of eight brigadier generals, despite a strong recommendation by the Army Chief. The officers have gone to court; a stay order reinstated them for the present, and a final judgement is expected soon. The third incident – which is believed to have made Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda personally furious – was when the Nepal Army partially withdrew from the national games when the Government decided to allow the PLA to participate.

The Maoist-led Government primarily blames Katawal for these recent controversies, for the inability of the Government and Army to work together, and for the lack of progress on integration and rehabilitation of the PLA. Against this backdrop, citing the logic of civilian supremacy, the Maoists are seeking to get rid of him. Other non-Maoist political forces – especially the Nepali Congress (NC), a faction of the Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), and a few Madhesi parties – see this as a move by the Maoists to cripple and co-opt the last institution capable of withstanding a total Maoist capture of the state. The President, Dr. Ram Baran Yadav, – who is the Supreme Commander of the NA – has advised the PM not to dismiss the Chief, as such a move would ‘create complications’ in the peace process, and has advised Prachanda to seek a political consensus first. Most critically, the Indian establishment is learnt to have warned the Maoist Government not to touch the Army structure and chain of command. India has promised the Army that its interests would be protected in return for its support during the peace process, and sees the institution as the last defence against Maoist authoritarianism.

Hidden within this conventional narrative are complex motivations and behind-the-scene maneuvers at play. The Army hierarchy is at a particular juncture where the timing of Katawal’s dismissal or retirement will determine who the next Chief will be. If the Government succeeds in sacking Katawal right now, General Kul Bahadur Khadka would be appointed Chief and given an extension in his tenure, which otherwise ends in June. If Katawal retires on schedule in September, Khadka would be gone by then, and General Chhatraman Singh Gurung will take over.

General Khadka is learnt to be lobbying hard for the job. Some reports suggest that he has gone to the extent of assuring the Maoist leadership that if he is appointed Chief, he would pave the way for bulk integration of Maoist soldiers in the PLA and give Maoist commanders space in the command structure of the national Army. The Maoists clearly feel that sacking Katawal and appointing Khadka will ensure a pliable chain of command which would toe their line; it would also create a culture within the Army where all officers would look to the Maoists for patronage; this in turn would substantially dilute the possibility of an Army-backed alternative formation.

The Maoists did their homework. They secured the assent of Jhalanath Khanal, Chairman of the CPN-UML, before he left on a visit to China – which he has since had to cut short and rush back when a faction within his party vociferously opposed the Government’s attempted move. They spoke to the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum leader and foreign minister Upendra Yadav, who has conspicuously been silent on the matter – a silence that is construed as assent. They even reached out to Sujata Koirala, daughter of former Prime Minister G.P. Koirala, who was reportedly assured of a space in the ruling dispensation if she played along.

But what they possibly failed to anticipate – unless the intention was to polarise politics – was the extent of opposition, Indian pressure, and the role of the president.

Most leaders of the Nepali Congress and the K.P. Oli led faction within the CPN-UML feel that the Maoists have shifted goalposts after the elections and are seeking to infiltrate all state organs in a bid to establish total control. The non-Maoist parties – which have not been able to build up a real political opposition on the ground – see the Maoist logic of civilian supremacy over the Army as code for establishing Maoist supremacy over the Army.

At the time of writing, the political mood remains tense. There is enormous pressure on the Maoists to pull back from the decision. But the Maoists have made it clear that it would be untenable for them to stay on in Government, if they do not follow up after having gone this far. Prime Minister Dahal has been told by his party secretariat to push for a consensus, preferably, but not to back out from taking action against Katawal if necessary. There are also rumours that the Maoists have told their fraternal organisations to be ready for a massive show of strength in the streets.

The CPN-UML remains divided, but is learned to have come up with a compromise formula, where both General Katawal and General Khadka are asked to leave, and the third in line – General Gurung – is appointed chief. The NC is, however, rigid, and has declared that any action against General Katawal would end the possibility of co-operation from the NC to the Government.

There have also been hectic diplomatic consultations between the Prime Minister and Indian Ambassador, Rakesh Sood, who even flew to Delhi for a day to speak to his South Block bosses. The Indians are continuing to tell the Maoists that any action would invite serious costs; India would have to rethink its political support for the peace and constitution building process; and may even have to start looking for alternative political arrangements.

While there have been reports of a coup if Katawal is sacked, the Army has denied the possibility. Some Army officers may have been tempted to move in that direction, but it is difficult to see how a coup can be effectively pulled off, and how sustainable it can be, given the enveloping political climate, the reluctance of international actors to back such an adventure, and the overwhelming power of the Maoists on the streets.

What is clear, however, is that the political experiment embarked on with the 12-point agreement signed between the political parties and Maoists in Delhi in November 2005, is unraveling. The mistrust between the actors has increased, perhaps irreversibly. The NC-Maoist, Army-Maoist, India-Maoist relationships are all in tatters. The possibility of meaningful discussion on the Constitution, or even the chance of it being written in time, has dipped drastically. And while Kathmandu politics polarises, the state has become even more crippled out in the Districts, with a multitude of ethnic militants groups challenging its legitimacy.

Three years after the King surrendered power, bowing to the People’s Movement, Nepal is on the brink yet again.

[South Asia Intelligent Review]