The last –- for now -- war in the Middle East (from 27 December 2008 to 17 January 2009), began actually on 4 November 2008, the same day the U.S. presidential elections took place. It began with an under-reported Israeli raid on Gaza, which broke de facto the six-month truce indirectly reached between Israel and HAMAS on 19 June, and this was to expire on 19 December with sound chances of renewal – at least until 10 February 2009 general elections in Israel.

Anyway, that war seems to have been a convenient political requirement for all parties involved, regardless of 1,315 deaths and near 5,500 injured. Read why: 

1. – Israel

On the one hand, the Israeli military lost much of its prestige and image of “invulnerability” and “invincibility” as a result of the war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

Never before had the Israel military machinery suffered any visible defeat -- though relative, in spite of the fact that it was involved in three previous regional big wars (1948, 1956, and 1973) and other ‘smaller’ ones.

Consequently, the Israeli military -- probably strangely echoing the popular saying in the Middle East that Israel is not a State with an army, but an Army with a state -- could by no means afford keeping its weakened prestige in the eyes of the country’s own political forces, the Israel public, and vis-à-vis Washington and Europe as a “sub-contractor” for the defence of Western interests in the wider Middle East region.

On the other hand, Israel was preparing political elections that are considered key for its immediate future. Its government, which was born from the “disappearance” of the strong general and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (in coma for three years now), had to base on a wide coalition of which the ultra-orthodox Shas party is a decisive member.

The intrinsic weakness of this government gradually increased due to several factors, such as the corruption scandals in which Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (Kadima Party) has been involved and which forced him to reign; the internal sharp rivalry between him and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni Kadima Party) on the one hand and Defence Minister Ehud Barak (Labour Party) on the other, with the rightist hard-liner Benjamin Netanyahu’s star rising on the political horizon.

According to opinion polls and surveys in Israel, the war on Gaza increased the electoral scoring of the last three politicians, especially Levny and Barak.

But the war on Gaza apparently did not achieve the objective of restoring the Israeli military prestige, or eliminating HAMAS forever. It did not lead to strengthening the position of the so-called Arab moderates either-- let alone its Palestinian counterpart Mohamoud Abbas.

2. - HAMAS

HAMAS is the initials in Arabic of ‘Movement of Islamic Resistance’. Its vocation as an Islamic movement and as a resistance movement was clearly defined from the very beginning.

Three ears ago, HAMAS’ political leadership decided to take part in the legislative elections that the U.S. and Europe pressed for in the hope that the result they both wished and expected would strengthen the power of Palestinian moderates led by Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah.

HAMAS wanted instead to make a visible demonstration of its power as a movement opposing any partial settlement and demanding the full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions and thus the withdrawal of Israeli military from the territories occupied in the 1967 war, the establishment of a Palestinian independent State, with Jerusalem as its capital. HAMAS also demands the right of all Palestinians to return to Palestine.

But HAMAS never ever expected to win the elections. This fact was clearly acknowledged and stated by the leaders of all parties involved in the Middle East conflict, be those Arabs or Western.

However, HAMAS won those elections.

Therefore, HAMAS had to improvise a role that it had never expected to play.

HAMAS’ electoral victory in clean, transparent elections, according to all international observers, created a great problem to all the other parties. See Abbas, the moderate Arabs, the U.S., Europe, and of course Israel.

Consequently, HAMAS was converted into an obstacle on the planned road for the new settlement that the U.S. establishment had foreseen for the region, with the approval of all the above-mentioned parties. As such, that ‘obstacle’ had to be removed.

The story of the siege, the blockade of frontier passages, the cut of food, medicines and fuel supplies, the closure of all ways of access, the cut of financial aid especially from the European Union, etc, is too well known.

A decision was taken: HAMAS is a terrorist group to be added to the long list of terrorist groups that was open on the occasion of the ‘war on terrorism’. The war on Gaza might have strengthened HAMAS. Like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the movement has resisted and was not impressed by the biggest military machine in the whole region.

By the way, HAMAS is the main actor on Gaza stage, but not the only one. A number of smaller Palestinian armed-autonomous factions form together with HAMAS what the Palestinians and several Arabs consider as the bulk of Palestinian Resistance.


3. - Mahmoud Abbas

Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, has always followed the principle of negotiating with Israel as a way to achieve Palestinian aspirations of an independent State.

Some see in his eagerness to accomplish this mission as a sort of achieving by the way his intimate aspiration to become the hero who liberated Palestine and was proclaimed its first ever President. But he failed, so far. Abbas did not move a single step forward. He kept going in a never-ending process of negotiations that actually has led nowhere.

And above all, Abbas proved to be incapable to fulfill the U.S. and Israeli mandate to remove the obstacle called
HAMAS from the political scenario considered a must to get back to the road that Washington and Tel Aviv had planned to “settle” the conflict.

Most likely, Abbas will be further weakened, unless Arab and non-Arab maneuvers help him strengthen his ‘leadership’ in the general and presidential elections he has been calling for in the Palestinian Territories -- and which will probably be held shortly after the Israeli poll.

4. - The Arabs

The task of eliminating HAMAS was expected to receive the support of the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. If not actively, at least visibly, they all abstained from taking any contrary position to the plan, let alone their agreement with it and its ultimate objectives.

It was then that the weakened Israeli ruling politicians decided to take over and do the job (of eliminating HAMAS) by themselves.

That was convenient both militarily and politically, in particular on the eve of the arrival of Barack Obama in the White House and the vital need to renew the “West defence sub-contract”.

But the war in Gaza has had a very negative consequence for Arab regimes. And what maybe considered more worrying and dangerous for their established powers: the popular anger.

Form Mauritania to Oman, people took to the streets shouting their anger: a seriously dangerous anger given the oppressing conditions they suffer from what they consider as a failure of their rulers to meet their basic aspirations, let alone essential living needs. Simply and clearly people vowed not to trust them any more.

Among other consequences, the war in Gaza accelerated the removal of political masks that most of the Arab region’s rulers had donned.

Every single Arab leader was pushed to put his cards on the table and most of them had to quickly put aside these cards and ask for new ones. The game was going on very fast and too much was at stake.

5. - The United States

The U.S. was living through “power vacuum” days (called transition), which could not be more convenient to both the outgoing Administration (“we can do anything”) and the coming one (“there is only one President at a time and it is George Bush”).

Here the establishment imposed its rules. The U.S. establishment, regardless of the President, had and still has a plan for the Middle East. Up to the President, whoever that might be, to decide how to implement it.

And the plan is to “delete” HAMAS, with the following objectives:
a) to demonstrate, once more, that the U.S. is the key and only actor in the Middle East,
b) To isolate Hezbollah, now that the Israeli military was unable to eliminate during its war on Lebanon two-and-a-half years ago.
In the eyes of the U.S. establishment, Hezbollah is the long arm of Iran and what is considered its direct ally (Syria) in the Middle East.
Actually, it was reported that the war on Lebanon was a necessary step to attacking Syria, as also a necessary step to attacking Iran.
c) And above all, once HAMAS has been eliminated, Hezbollah isolated, and Syria neutralized, to launch the planned military attack on Iran.

This is what the U.S. establishment wants. And this is, at the end of the day, what the Obama Administration will most likely have to deal with.

Obama himself during his electoral campaign, talked about chances to negotiate with Iran, but he always reminded that all options would be on the table, without discarding the military one.

Obama knew about the plans of the war on Gaza -- reports, never denied by any official, confirm that a delegation of the State Department, the Defense Department and CIA, met Obama to brief him on this plan. Apparently he never opposed it, and maybe even welcomed the fact that the outgoing Administration will handle the “dirty” job.

In his speech on 20 January as the 44th president of the United States, Obama explicitly mentioned Iraq and Afghanistan, but only implicitly Iran and the Middle East.

Nevertheless, one sentence appeared to define his plan for the whole region, probably also specifically referring to the recent war on Gaza: Our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please... our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, said Obama.

6. - Iran

Iran chose a prudent approach -- not to be actively involved. Its strong declared support to the “Palestinian resistance” and severe condemnation of Israel never passed the limits of ‘moral’ support. No major risk, therefore, to Obama eventually opening negotiations with Teheran.

But the war on Gaza brought another convenient outcome to Tehran: Qatar -- which played a critical role in the game by bringing together in Doha the leaders of the “accused” (Syria and HAMAS itself, among other Arab leaders) -- invited Iran to participate in the consultative summit on Gaza in Doha.

7. - Turkey

Exhausted by the European demands for internal reforms, freedom, democracy and other related wording, and faced nevertheless by an iron opposition to join the European Christian Club, Ankara opted for walking all the way back to the East, the Middle East.

From the very first moment, Turkey condemned the war on Gaza and charged Israel with abuses and crimes against humanity and international law. Recep Tayyeb Erdogan moved quickly from one capital to other, met leaders, proposed plans, and joined all meetings to which he was invited and which he wanted to attend.

Simply stated: instead of geographically moving the EU to the borders of the Middle East, Turkey moved itself to the Middle East. That was convenient to Ankara.

The war on Gaza appeared to be, therefore, convenient to everybody. What will happen from now on will be ‘business as usual’: the U.S. will try to accelerate negotiations to achieve the planned ‘settlements’ with Europes backing; the Arabs will claim individual triumph; Iran will be in trouble; and Turkey will become a strong actor in the region. What about Israel? It will step on the political road it started to walk a century ago. But to arrive where? Let us Wait and see. 

This article was completed on 21 January 2009. IDN – In Depth News