SOUTH ASIA

The tensions involve old players namely; the United Kingdom, Russia, Persia and the United States, assuming slightly modified positions and new players such as India, Pakistan, China and the Central Asian Republics. They signify the fragility of Afghanistan’s inner and outer regions. They also indicate that once again Afghanistan’s geo-strategic location, after a brief period of being an asset for all, might have already turned back into a liability.

Current regional tensions

The Russian Federation, the main inheritor of the Soviet legacy, after a period of political restructuring, economic recovery and military build-up, is now coming out of its historical “masterly inactivity” cocoon and wishes to regain its traditional place in regional and global games. It had reluctantly tolerated the NATO advances in its Central Asian backyard and feels that now is the time to sharply react to the regional motives of Western forces in Afghanistan. It wishes to clearly express its deep concerns over the turning of Central Asian republics into NATO “Partners of Peace” and the transfer of their excess energy to South Asia, and the aspirations of former satellite states, Ukraine and Georgia, to become new members of NATO.

While Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have shown some tendency towards the West, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have still remained firm in their allegiances with the Russian Federation and appear shy on regional platforms.

China and Iran, who have had their own deep-rooted grievances with Western powers, have indirectly welcomed the Russian moves to Western advances in the region. After reasserting its dominant role in world affairs, through hosting a highly successful Olympic Games, China will slowly but surely continue to challenge the superiority and regional agenda of the Western powers. Western pressures, designed to prevent Iran from developing a military nuclear capability, led Tehran coordinate its efforts with almost all forces hostile to the US and NATO military presence in the region.

The United Kingdom, the former colonial master of South Asia, which faced three major military defeats in Afghanistan between 1839-1919, has regained its foothold on the Afghan side of the now disputed Durand Line that it drew as the south-eastern border between British India and Afghanistan in 1893. Since the start of the war on terror, despite the loss of over 117 soldiers and dedication of massive development aid to Afghanistan, the UK has continued to call the Taliban a home grown movement of Afghanistan and has been a lot less vocal (compared to the US) about their Pakistani links. On occasions and in agreement with ISI justification, British officials have classified the Taliban as a genuine side of Afghan politics which must be taken seriously and accommodated through power sharing arrangement.

The lack of trust between India and Pakistan over the last 60 years, with no prospect of a resolution in the near future, has had its own catastrophic regional impact. Islamabad continues to look at Afghanistan through its lenses of mistrust and tension with New Delhi. Since late 2001, India has been the biggest regional contributor towards the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s ISI has been viewing this as Indian dominance in the region, which must be stopped at all costs. Pakistan denies land transit corridor between India and Afghanistan. By doing this it wants to monopolize its own access to the highly profitable Afghan and Central Asian markets. Also, it stops India from developing closer trade ties with the wider region. Some radical groups which were initially nurtured by the ISI are now out of control. Ongoing tension between Pakistani military and civilian politicians has made the matter worse.

Afghanistan itself, after taking some regional initiatives in 2002-2006, has failed to pursue the outcomes of these initiatives and develop consistent pro-active regional diplomacy. The 3rd Afghan-led Regional Economic Cooperation Conference (RECC), which was supposed to be held in Islamabad in November 2007, is now late by ten months and it is still not known when it will be held. Regional Cooperation Strategy of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) which was supposed to go through the phase of its implementation after the Paris Conference in June this year has already been overshadowed by a new set of contradictory and personalized foreign policy guidelines, announced in Kabul. Afghanistan has also been unable to develop an independent image of itself, beyond Western influences, and emerge as a trusted regional partner. Its presence on regional platforms has had more form than substance.

Victims of regional tensions

The war on terror, which once enjoyed the overwhelming support of regional and international actors, has now become the first victim of escalating tensions and rivalry among these actors. The ISI, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have emerged as key beneficiaries, turning the tribal belt between Pakistan and Afghanistan into an independent terrorist state. The United States, now preoccupied by its busy regional agenda, coupled with engagement in Iraq and an upcoming election, finds little time and not many genuine partners willing to fight the war on terror.

The second victim of the rising regional tension is the political, security, social and economic gains of Afghanistan in the past seven years, which has also benefited its neighbors and the world community at large. Hundreds of newly built schools have already been torched in southern Afghanistan. The loss of the peace dividend of Afghanistan and the return to chaos will have international consequences of great magnitude, threatening the standing of NATO and enhancing the spread of terror in Western cities.

The third victim is the current and future development programs of Afghanistan and regional economic cooperation and integration. The upsurge of insecurity has already frozen the development of some of those regional infrastructure projects which could have improved the security situation significantly.

What should be done?

Given the complexity of regional issues, multi-pronged initiatives need to be taken at unilateral, bilateral and multilateral levels, with the following components:

On the part of Western powers (United States and its allies)

1. In close consultation and coordination with the United Nations and Government of Pakistan, they should refocus on The War on Terror and seek a fresh mandate from the Security Council on shifting the geography of war to FATA area, where terrorist leadership, recruitment, training and logistic support are located. At the same time they should come up with a restructuring program for the ISI of Pakistan.

2. They need to take a number of confidence-building measures to reassure Afghanistan and its neighbors that their military presence in the region is solely for the purpose of War on Terror and stabilization of Afghanistan and no other motive is on the agenda. They should come up with an indicative timeline for this endeavor.

3. They need to genuinely promote and support the regional cooperation efforts of Afghanistan and its neighbors and try to coordinate their legitimate interests with them, within a legal dialogue framework. Major regional economic cooperation and integration projects, which will ultimately improve security, need the technical and financial support of G8.

On the part of Regional countries

1. Initiatives need to be taken to keep the impact of inter-regional conflicts away from Afghanistan e.g.; India-Pakistan, Iran-USA, Russia-NATO etc…. Perhaps Afghanistan could be declared a neutral country, similar to Switzerland. This requires its own set of policies and strategies.

On the part of Afghanistan

1. Through the implementation of the Regional Cooperation Strategy of the ANDS, it should increase its regional cooperation technical, administrative and coordination capacity and chalk out a pro-active and creative regional diplomacy programme, incorporating clear strategies for resolving outstanding regional problems, such as Durand Line, riparian waters etc…. with short, medium and long-term benchmarks.

2. Vigorously pursue the Kabul and Delhi Declarations of RECC Process. If holding the 3rd RECC in Islamabad faces further uncertainty, initiate early consultation with Pakistan and other regional countries on the possibility of holding it either in Kabul or another regional capital.

3. Appoint an authoritative, trusted, decision-making, vibrant and professional ambassador at large for the promotion of regional cooperation. The ambassador shall work within the framework of Afghanistan’s membership and affiliation in Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and RECC process and enjoy the full trust of the Afghan Government, Parliament and Judiciary. He/she should be familiar with regional issues and make sure that Afghanistan contributes to regional stability and prosperity. He/she should enhance the conditions for Afghanistan to resume its central role as a land bridge between Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and the Far East, as the best way of benefiting from increased trade and export opportunities.

4. Make specific efforts to stop the infiltration of neighboring spy agents in the state institutions of Afghanistan and strengthen its own counter-intelligence works.

Mahmoud Saikal served as Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister of Afghanistan (2005-2006) and Afghan Ambassador to Australia (2002-2005). This is the Summary Paper of Mr. Saikal’s presentation to the Afghanistan Review Conference in Bonn, September 2008.