Is
Pakistan a "Failed State" on the Verge of Collapse? 
Pakistan
is a failed state, that its collapse is imminent, that it is hotbed of
generating terrorist activities, that it is foothold of all
fundamentalists - these and many other comments we do hear all the
time.
In
the fourth annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN
POLICY and
The Fund for Peace rank the countries where state collapse may be just
one disaster away. Pakistan ranks 12th among top 60 nation-states most
likely to fail.
While
some aspects of such assertions are justified, it is equally correct to
say that some are result of wishful thinking.
Amulya
Gandhi analysed the Foreign Policy study in her article in Express
Buzz in August 2009:
Notwithstanding
high-minded advice to the contrary, it is more than likely that a
section of people all over the world, especially in India, have been
experiencing a feeling of schadenfreude about Pakistan.
This
undeniably unwholesome sense of enjoyment over its troubles may have
grown because of the realization that even as Pakistan battles its own
demons, it hasn’t quite stopped regarding India as its main enemy. It
isn’t only the army that sustains this view for its own self-serving
purpose; even the civil society is not totally immune from this
assessment. It is the longstanding belief amidst this class about
India’s supposedly malign intentions that have helped the army to
fashion its policies accordingly.
It
is quite possible that this perception can be result of a certain sense
of inherent sense of inferiority complex over India’s size, democracy,
cultural diversity, industrial and scientific progress and greater
military prowess. It has probably become deeper in recent years because
of its economic buoyancy and growing status as a regional power.
Till
recently there was always a clear indication of Nixonian infamous tilt
towards Pakistan and this tilt, along with the support of the China
generated a wishful desire to be treated as India’s equal. That hope
has not only vanished, but has also shown a more realistic appreciation
of its values. Islamabad had never shown any inclination for genuine
friendship with India. The menace of fundamentalism was encouraged by
the Pakistani establishment to bleed India with a thousand cuts, to
quote a familiar jihadi phrase, when it realized that it couldn’t win
a war after the 1971 defeat.
Along
with China, Pakistan poses the most serious threat to India’s since
1947. That Islamabad and Beijing are nuclear powers adds to the danger.
Arguably, a majority of the ordinary people of Pakistan do not harbour
any ill-will towards India. But Pakistan’s terrorist-military combine
certainly does along with a measure of tacit endorsement from the
civilian elite. This was evident when the Pakistani TV channels refused
even to acknowledge what India said about the Mumbai mayhem and some
analysts even blamed India for the attack on the Sri Lankan cricketers.
If
India had been provoked into starting a war after 26/11, then China
would have in all probability stepped in to grab southern Tibet, which
is their name for Arunachal Pradesh, an objective which was openly
stated by one of Beijing’s commentators. Even if India’s show of
restraint defused the situation, there is every danger of the fact that
Islamabad may follow the same tack again. Against the background of this
potent threat from Islamabad with China palpably becoming more
aggressive than before, the old arguments about India favoring a
prosperous and democratic Pakistan are wearing thin.
Democracy
is not Pakistan’s natural form of government, as it isn’t in most
Islamic countries, except Turkey. Even there, it is the army’s support
for secularism along with Kemal Ataturk’s extraordinary legacy, which
has ensured the survival of democracy, but the threat from the Islamists
is always there. In Pakistan, as the experience of the Zardari-Gilani
government shows, the chances of a civilian administration acquiring the
genuine powers of governance are remote. The army still continues to
call the shots in the foreseeable future and will have no hesitation in
pursuing clandestine operations to undermine India even as the civilian
leaders of the two countries engage in a dialogue. Even ISI behaves as a
state within state, as was evident when its chief desired that India
talks to it directly. The army will lose its raison d’ etre without
holding up India as a permanent threat.
The
alternative picture of a disintegrating Pakistan is not all that
disheartening. For a start, such a scene will be devoid of the sham of
negotiations under the pretence that the Pakistan army, the ISI and
their strategic assets, the terrorists, are waiting eagerly for peace to
break out. It is clear that the objective of making borders irrelevant,
as once suggested by Manmohan Singh, cannot be pursued as long as the
military nurtures the jihadis and China waits to pounce the moment when
India appears to be in serious trouble.
If
Pakistan falls apart, two purposes will be served — at least in the
immediate future. First, China will lose its all-weather friend. It is
this possibility that may have made Beijing more assertive in recent
years. Al-Qaeda’s interest in the Xinjiang unrest is another factor
that is likely to make Beijing reassess its options. Secondly, the
Pakistan army will be too embroiled in quelling the internal upheaval in
a disintegrating country to think of provoking India.
True,
an imploding Pakistan will become even more of an epicentre of terrorism
than at present. But this will be only a matter of degree. Terrorists
are already well-entrenched in the Afghanistan-Pak region with Osama bin
Laden and Mullah Omar living in safe houses.
A
formal collapse of the civilian government in Islamabad will not make
much of a difference. In a way, it will be a return to the colonial
period when the British found virtually the entire area ungovernable.
The only difference between then and now is Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal. But the Americans probably have a contingency plan to take them
out. However, the terrorists themselves may not have as much of a free
run as they may initially expect since the Baloch and Sindhi
nationalists will also come out in the open. This group will also be
wary of a Pakhtun upsurge in the guise of fundamentalism.
For
India and the rest of the world, the scene may well become less
confusing, for there will no longer be a dysfunctional state trying to
pretend that it hasn’t failed, or an army which prefers to run with
the hare and hunt with the hounds. Instead, the ensuing chaos may well
enable the US and the NATO forces to act with greater purposefulness to
eliminate the terrorists, who will no longer have the Pakistan army
trying to ensure that they are not totally destroyed. The maelstrom may
even prepare the ground for a new geopolitical mosaic with the Pakhtun
areas going over to Afghanistan and Sindh moving closer to India.
Of
the two Islamic countries that emerged in the subcontinent in 1947 and
1971, Bangladesh has acquired an element of stability because it never
chased the chimera of parity with India. Its gentle Bengali culture with
its leitmotif of somnolent villages and waterlogged paddy fields also
nurtured a benign form of Islam far different from the sanguinary tribal
concepts of war and revenge, which have long been characteristic of the
deserts and mountains of the northwest. In all probability, Bangladesh
will prove more durable than ‘moth-eaten’ (Jinnah’s words)
Pakistan even if the Quaid-e-Azam’s focus was more on the latter.
Just
as the Soviet Union collapsed because of the strain of matching
America’s might, Pakistan is falling apart because of its antagonism
towards India. There is little India can do to save it. The only pity is
that the Mohenjodaro and Harappan sites may be destroyed like the
Bamiyan Buddhas by the religious zealots, thereby confirming the
collapsing country’s image as a state that never knew whether it
belonged to the subcontinent with its tolerant traditions or to the less
benign West Asia.
_____________________
The
article was submitted by Dr
Bikram Lamba, a multi disciplinary writer, has published four books
and presented over 1000 papers in workshops, seminars, and interactive
meetings. He writes OPED
for NY Times, regular columns for Mississauga Business Bulletin
and Mississauga Business Times. He has also contributed to,
amongst other publications, The Patrides and CanIndia. He is a political
and business strategist and a consultant.
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