The examples in northwest Pakistan are damning. Osama bin Laden and his top associates are almost certainly hiding there. American commanders in the east of Afghanistan have complained repeatedly that their bases have been attacked, and troops killed, by militants who strike and then flee back over the border into Pakistan.
Worse, the Pakistani government has been playing a double game with extremists, ever since its strenuous pledges to support the U.S. campaign against terrorism, after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001,
Islamabad's powerful, shadowy spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, has a long history of providing assistance, information and protection to the likes of the Taliban, and it continues to do so.
Most Western intelligence services agree that the ISI has been providing active support for terror attacks inside of Afghanistan, including the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in July. Mr. Kayani is thought to have approved of that operation in his role as head of the army.
In light of such treachery, why should Washington wait for a green light from the Pakistani government before acting, when it identifies threats to its soldiers or to stability on the Afghan side of the border?
Some Pakistani leaders have made good-faith efforts to bring militant activity under control, and rein in the ISI. The new President, Asif Ali Zardari, will have to walk a tightrope, assisting Western anti-terrorist efforts, while not excessively provoking Pakistani extremists. And offending the military, which has few reservations about intervening in politics, has generally been an unwise idea in Pakistan.
But until and unless Islamabad can take responsibility for what goes on in territory it nominally rules, American raids should continue, and they do not require the Pakistani government's permission.
