South Asian Outlook: An Independent e-Monthly | South Asia: Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Maldives

The upshot has led to increasing realisation among the US and NATO allies of the ferocity of the situation, and thus the need to re-examine their approach, to-date, toward the mission in the country.

“Insurgent violence is at its highest level in Afghanistan since U.S.-led forces ousted the Taliban after the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. Suicide bombings, for example, have climbed 30 percent in some areas”, U.S. military has been quoted explaining reasons for the decision.

US officials further revealed that the review would encompass a wide range of the campaign by the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, even so, some officials also forewarned against drawing any parallel to that of the scale of last year’s sweeping review of the war in Iraq by the US.

As a matter of fact, a glance at the year-round declining security trend bestows a picture-perfect justification for the re-examination of the situation, as a great many within and outside Afghanistan hold the perception that the country stands at a tipping point.

However, irrespective of its scale and scope, the real utility and efficacy of any review would solely rest upon the genuine intents by the international community to redress some of its fundamentally flawed approach toward the situation.

Yes, there is an unequivocal common recognition of the ceaseless Taliban insurgency and cross-border terrorist onslaughts across large swaths in the sought and east of the country, as much has been said about it as the existing external factor which continues to account for much of the feeble state of security. Notwithstanding there are also an awful lot of other factors in terms of the approach by the international community with nexus to different fronts, which have contributed to the exacerbation of the overall situation demanding a change of course now.

Above and beyond all else comes the notorious role played by the Pakistani Junta and the ISI. For almost four decades now, Pakistan has been engaged in outright state-sponsored campaign of subjugation in Afghanistan through relentless, unremitting and unabated pursuit of an aggressive and interventionist policy shrouded with systematic and flagrant lies, deception, cheating, falsification, perversion and distortion of the plain facts and realities to the Pakistani public and to the international community as a whole, guised by an ostensible dilemma, all naively aimed at acquiring a ‘strategic depth’ against likelihood of a war with the neighbouring India.

The subversive recourse adopted as a means for achieving the stated objective, at times creeping in nature, became fully naked and out in the open after 1994 when the Taliban mercenaries crafted by Pakistan’s military intelligence under the stated ‘demographic and geographic interests’, blatantly touted by the recently over-night-turned-plain clothes-Musharraf, were dispatched into Afghanistan along with scores of Pakistani paramilitary units and ex-army officers.

However, the wishful ‘strategic depth’ dogma pursued by Musharraf Junta not only failed to materialize in Afghanistan, but in fact miserably miscarried, backfired and ended in fiasco as Pakistan itself started to being gradually bogged down into terrorism and anarchic frenzy, which manifested itself in full swing with the latest assassination of Pakistan’s former Prime Minister and the chairperson of Pakistan Peoples party, Benazir Bhutto.

Forty years on, today, whilst Afghanistan has survived the utter cruelty and sheer brutality in the hands of a sadistic neighbour, who sought to turn a proud Muslim nation already preyed upon, in vein, by a Super Power, suffering gruesome human toll with manifold maimed and handicapped, immeasurable collateral and material damage and millions in refugees, into subservience, Pakistan for its part -- thanks to the short-sighted, egocentric, self-centered and tactless Junta and the ISI -- now bears witness to the near end-results of that grotesquely erroneous doctrine. The disquieting situation in which Pakistan is being gripped -- scoffingly dubbed by many as a ‘strategic ditch’ -- is the virtual translation of Pakistan’s chronic wrongful policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, let alone the deep-seated resentment and indignation Pakistan has earned amongst all ethnic groups of Afghanistan as a nation, whom otherwise could have been seen as a fraternal neighbour of strong historical bonds.

With a view to the above, the time is ripe for the international community to re-visit its rules of engagement with Pakistan over Afghanistan. Six straight years into the peace process in Afghanistan, it is simply preposterous if the international community still chooses to go on with its perpetuated appeasement policy toward Pakistan, for whatever reason, and turn a blind eye to the physical infrastructure, recruiting and training centers and hideouts of terrorism within its territory, and the steady flow of logistical and organizational support it provides to the insurgency.

Enough has been said of the resurgence of militancy in Afghanistan and of Musharraf’s correlating intriguing posturing over the past six years. Let’s call a spade a spade. The root cause of the dragging problems in Afghanistan lies in Pakistan, as repeatedly spelled out by President Karzai. And the Pakistani Junta remains overtly complicit by playing both the fire fighter and the arsonist. No more and no less.

Pakistani Junta must realize that the ‘strategic depth’ dashing pipe dream in Afghanistan is an imperative of the past as the prospects of the phantom war with India, for that matter, seem inconceivable. Besides if the Talibanization of Afghanistan is to serve containment of the domestic religious and nationalist backlash within Pakistani society, as occasionally implied, it no longer presents the rationale for the stance, for the most part because Pakistan have both the ultra religio-nationalist phenomena already at its doorsteps as a boomerang, which would have to be recognized as tangible ground realities and managed within the context of regional and global cooperation. Furthermore, if the current line of policy to destabilize Afghanistan is having to do with the border dispute over the Durand Line, then the two countries must demonstrate mutual sincerity, political maturity and gusts to convene serious negotiations under the supervision of international community and through holding referendum and/or national plebiscite in their respective nations aimed at bringing the issue to a peaceful resolution.

That said, Pakistan has been generously given the benefit of the doubt over its activities in Afghanistan for decades, and clearly the time has come that the international community must deal with Pakistan firmly and resolutely and make the Junta halt its overt and covert support for the insurgency in Afghanistan, end the cross-border militant incursions, and verifiably dismantle all terrorist camps inside Pakistan once and for all. Otherwise, as President Karzai emphatically has said time and again, the international community must take the war to the actual sources of terrorism.

Secondly, the selective mindset and duplicitous methodology with which the international community behaves toward the very dynamics of the political set up and the overall process would have to change.

Six years into the process, it has become obvious now that the widely perceived politically motivated term ‘war lord’ having been frantically used, over-used, misused, abused, you name it, has lost meaning and vitality in the eyes of the nation. The application of the term, apart from the random individual manipulation against political opponents, at times has made its way to derisiveness whereby Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and certain government officials, for one reason or another, are all on the record conveniently finding common ground with the term while referring to particular political opponents.

With much of the security situation in shambles, the international community has reached a critical juncture to come to terms with realities and let go of the double standard and duality, open up and embrace an inclusive, balanced and all-encompassing approach toward all moderate peaceful political forces across Afghanistan. In this context, the international community must recognize it joined the theatre of the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan in late 2001, virtually half a decade after it had started and was being waged in full swing by the indigenous Afghan national resistance forces comprising all ethnic groups of the country single-handedly and with enormous sacrifices.

The international community must rise to the opportunity, now and before it is too late, and reach out to all the forces, those loyal to the government, to the constitution and the overall process, willing and capable to render their spontaneous and sincere services as part of the methodical state apparatus and in the spirit of national unity to sway, motivate, and rally the general public around the democratically-elected government of President Karzai, aimed at improving the situation and breaking the prevailing vicious cycle of terror and violence against the people of Afghanistan and providing conducive environment for the vital rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the county to continue. Make no mistake the process has already attracted enough enemies, left and right, and we need not further alienation and poking many more to turn enemies.

Thus it is time that the international community must move beyond the erstwhile chapter of ‘war lords’ and a part from the real war lords bring into focus rather other lords; the squanderers of donor funds to the helpless people of Afghanistan, the embezzlers of development projects’ accounts and finances and the plunderers of public wealth and property, the lords of drugs and of the scandalous rampant corruption within the government. The pretentious self-defined pundits whom, having spent six years, are yet out of touch with their people and the core realities of the country and who always tend to be a party to the recycled distractive inter-ethnic and sectarian squabble detrimental to the national unity and the strategic well-being of the county. The bellicose revisionists who opt for bridging 4-decades of history in Afghanistan through attempts to create rift and wedge amongst the people along ethnic, linguistic and regional lines vying for political expediency, while at times even blaming President Karzai for alleged soft-handedness against their select targets. Deeds that run utterly counter to the very stipulations enshrined in the country’s adopted constitution and indeed to the essence of the collective efforts by the international community for a democratic, indivisible and pluralistic Afghanistan.

And finally, the international community must re-assess its posturing and the conduct of policy with respect to expanding the physics of the political structure in Afghanistan.

The international community must work cohesively and in close collaboration with the government of Afghanistan including the country’s elected parliament, with due transparency, in its bid to pursue negotiations with all those rank and file combatants, who are willing and ready to lay down their arms, break with their past and come to political fold in good faith and without any pre-conditions, pledging allegiance to Afghanistan’s constitution in its entirety, with the sole aspiration to re-integrate into the society and pursue a peaceful life.

The international community must strictly adhere to its commitments and obligations to the inviolability of the sovereignty of the elected government of Afghanistan and the sanctity of its constitutional duties before the Afghan nation in dealing with the state affairs.

Deal-makings and resort to extra-territorial practices modeled on obsolete, démodé and anachronistic formulations -- at odds with the statehood of the country and inconsistent with the geo-political and socio-strategic realities of the present-day Afghanistan -- would only lead to the loss of faith of the people in the government and erosion of the legitimacy of the system.

Let’s be mindful of the fact that after all we are living in the 21st Century, the epoch of social and political consciousness of the masses and nations, as contemporarily bore witness to the historic paradoxes from the former Soviet Union to the Balkans.

Indeed the situation in Afghanistan requires a review. But a review must sanction fresh perspectives and altered modus operandi so as to lead us to the desired end.

Sharif Ghalib served at the UN for ten years, and was the first Afghan diplomat to negotiate the establishment of full bilateral diplomatic and consular relations between Afghanistan and Canada at resident-embassy level. He opened the Embassy of Afghanistan in Ottawa in late 2002 and served as the country’s Charge d’Affaires, a.i., and Minister Counselor until 2005.

[Source: Afghan Online Press]

Afghan rugs showcased in WMC

LAS VEGAS: A delegation of Afghan rug producers travelled to the United States for a special showcase on Afghanistan's economic and cultural revival at the World Market Center in Las Vegas from January 28 February 1, 2008.

Afghan Inspirations, located in Building B, showroom B-162, exhibited some of the world's most in-demand hand-woven rugs, which have been celebrated for their ornate, one-of-a-kind designs and ancient weaving techniques.

Afghanistans Minister of Commerce and Industry Dr. Mir Muhammad Amin Farhang and Ambassador to the United States Said Tayeb Jawad discussed the importance of the rug sector to the revival of Afghanistans export economy at an Afghan Gala and Buffet, January 29 from 5- 7 p.m. This event featured Afghan culture, cuisine, fashion and music.

The event is the product of a close collaboration between the Embassy of Afghanistan, the World Market Center, and the U.S. Department of Commerces Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (AIRTF). The U.S. commercial relationship with Afghanistan has grown exponentially in recent years. As of October 2007, two-way trade reached $470 million, a 25 percent increase over 2006. As an element of this bilateral trade, Afghan rugs are allowed access to the American market duty free, creating opportunities that facilitate business partnerships. A delegation of Afghan rug producers visited the U.S. in July 2006, to learn about doing business in the American textile market. At the AMERICASMART ATLANTA international rug show in January 2007, the Afghan delegation sold out their stock within minutes, reflecting an eager demand for the intricate and unique Afghan rug designs.

Afghanistan is one of the leading manufactures of quality hand-woven rugs in the world. Rug production once was one of the country's biggest industries and, before 1978, Afghanistan's rugs ranked fifth amongst the country's exports. Afghan rug producers continue to be among the most innovative, experienced and dependable in the world and the rugs have become a part of Afghanistan's national identity. The indigenous Afghan carpet sector absorbs many influences and traditions from the surrounding countries, stretching from China to Morocco, to produce the unique, rich and diverse hand-made rugs.

[Source: PAJHWOK ]

On January 23, Bangladesh Chief Advisor Fakhruddin Ahmed, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, minced no words in elaborating the achievements of the Interim Administration. While underlining the promise to hold the much-awaited Parliamentary elections in December 2008, Ahmed indicated that the tenure of his administration had been peaceful and comforting for each Bangladeshi. "Not a single bullet was fired, not a single bomb went off during this Government," he declared. The Chief Advisor, however, failed to mention his Government’s inability to dispel the pervasive sense of popular unease rooted in political uncertainty and poor economic condition that constantly threatens to undermine the sense of peace and tranquillity in this country of 150 millions.

Clearly, however, elements of the Islamist militancy that grew in the country under active political patronage under the preceding regimes, appeared to have been negotiated rather well by the Interim Government. Ahmed’s regime has successfully targeted the vast network of the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and its affiliate, the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), a task that appeared to have been deliberately left unfinished by the previous Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led regime. The execution of the top JMB-JMJB leadership on April 30, 2007, was the high point of the Government’s measures against Islamist radicalism. In the early hours on that day, the outfit’s chief Abdur Rahman and second-in-command, Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai, Majlish-e-Shura (the highest decision-making body) members Abdul Awal, Khaled Saifullah and Ataur Rahman Sunny, and suicide squad member Iftekhar Hasan Al-Mamun, were hanged in different prisons. On March 4, 2007, President Iajuddin Ahmed had rejected the mercy petitions of the six leaders, who had been arrested in 2006. While the hurried execution, about two weeks before the anticipated days, did send a strong message to the surviving cadres and over-ground workers of the outfit, the Government’s step was also interpreted in informed circles as a move that failed to unravel the dynamics underlying the group’s dramatic rise. The Government had, in fact, barred the Press from talking to these militants and even the Court proceedings had been held in camera. As the leaders of the JMB walked to the gallows, the curtain fell on the forces that had catapulted a small gang of Islamists to a level where it had dared to coordinate and execute a simultaneous nation-wide series of bombings in 63 of the country’s 64 Districts, and to openly flaunt its nexus with al Qaeda.

Since the execution of the JMB leaders, over a hundred of JMB cadres, mostly lower-rung activists have been arrested from various parts of the country. The group’s backbone has been broken as a result of this neutralisation process. Intelligence reports did suggest a possible mutation of the JMB into gangs such as the Allahr Dal (Allah’s Group), Jamal-al-Jadid (New Glory) and the Jadid al Qaeda (The New Base). On May 1, three explosions at the main railway stations in Dhaka, the southern port of Chittagong and the northeastern city of Sylhet brought back memories of the country-wide explosions on August 17, 2005. However, as in the previous serial blasts, the explosives used remained low-grade and were visibly not intended to kill. The hitherto unknown outfit Jadid al Qaeda (JaQ) claimed responsibility for the attack, in which a lone person was injured. Between May and June 2007, this group went on to plant seven explosives at the Rajshahi University of Engineering and Technology (RUET), all of which were recovered before their detonation. Subsequently, a few cadres of the JaQ, including Abul Hossain Tutul, who had allegedly planted the explosives at RUET were arrested. Activities of the new Islamist groups thereafter remained limited to issuing Press statements threatening to carry out attacks. None of these threats was, however, translated into action.

While international pressure and the shock of the August 2005 serial bombings had forced the erstwhile BNP regime to initiate action against the JMB-JMJB combine after the country-wide attacks, the Harkat-ul Jihad-i Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) remained outside the scope of official action. Except for the October 1, 2005, arrest of its ‘operations commander’ Mufti Abdul Hannan, none of HuJI-B’s functionaries were apprehended by the law-enforcement agencies. It is useful to recall that HuJI-B has been involved in a number of recent terrorist incidents in India, has deep linkages with terrorist organizations based in Pakistan, including al Qaeda, is believed to constitute a significant international terrorist threat, and figures in the US State Department’s list of ‘other terrorist groups’. Towards the end of 2007, however, the Interim Government appeared to have initiated some action against this group as well. On October 28 and 29, nine suspected HuJI-B militants were arrested from Narsingdi, Jhenidah, Magura, Khulna and Dhaka along with 60 kilograms of explosives, 16 grenades, rifles, handguns, various equipment and ammunition. Whether the arrest was a result of the Interim government’s attempt at pursuing the outfit or a mere accident, however, remained unclear, and it is notable that the regime is yet to act with a firmness comparable to that shown in the case of the JMB-JMJB, against the HUJI-B leadership.

Total fatalities as a result of Islamist militant violence over the period 2006-07 were at a low 20, with just seven of these civilian, and no losses to the Security Forces (SFs).

Going by fatalities alone, one would be led to believe that there is a raging Left Wing insurgency across Bangladesh. The truth is, Left-wing insurgency in Bangladesh is a highly dispersed, low-scale and criminalised movement consisting of a multiplicity of minor groups. Nevertheless, this feeble and degenerate movement continued to be the principal focus of SF ‘counter-terrorist’ responses, especially of operations by the elite Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a specialised ‘anti-crime’ para-military force under the Home Ministry. Over the past years, RAB personnel had attained a measure of notoriety by arresting and then eliminating a number of alleged Left Wing Extremists (LWE) in fake encounters, and this trend continued uninterrupted through 2007, albeit at a somewhat diminished scale. Thus as compared to 139 LWE fatalities in 2006, the year 2007 registered 72 LWE deaths. Strong action by the SFs left the movement, already weakened by continuous infighting, in complete disarray. Even though media reports, quoting unnamed intelligence officials, continued to indicate some level of mobilisation by LWE groups, especially in the western and central Districts, their activities through out the year did not go beyond random acts of thuggery and extortion. The surrender of 104 cadres of the Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP) at the remote Deshigram village in Tarash Sub-district of Sirajganj District on December 1, 2007, constituted a serious setback to the most dominant of the Left Wing extremist factions in the country.

The Interim Government, however, continued to pay scant regard to India’s concerns on the activities of insurgent groups operating in India’s northeastern States. Since the early 1990s, top leadership and cadres of a number of Indian terrorist and insurgent groups, including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), and the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), have bases in Bangladesh. According to the Indian Border Security Force’s (BSF) January 2008 estimates, 141 camps of terrorist and insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast were in existence in Bangladesh. Successive political regimes in Dhaka, however, have continued to summarily dismiss such claims. There were initial hopes – however faint – that the Interim Government would change the long-standing Bangladeshi policy on providing support and safe haven to Indian insurgents, but the new regime has continued with the policy of denial.

Throughout 2007, political developments in Bangladesh received more attention than measures against militancy. The declaration of Emergency on January 11, 2007, created a larger role and longer tenure for the Interim Government. Under normal circumstances, the responsibility of the Interim Government is restricted to preparing ground work for the parliamentary elections, and its tenure limited to 90 days. However, sharp political polarisation between the BNP and the Awami League (AL) had created a logjam and the continuation of the Interim Government (comprising a Chief Advisor and 11 Advisors), emerged as the ‘only option’. Since then, with the active backing of the Army, the Interim Government has firmly entrenched itself in power and in every segment of administration. Despite the Interim Government’s repeated assurances about holding a free and fair parliamentary poll by the end of December 2008, many suspect that Bangladesh’s tryst with the present non-party military backed administration is likely to be a prolonged one.

The grand strategy of the Interim Administration is being articulated through steps purportedly undertaken against pervasive corruption in the country, the implementation of extensive reforms in the organisation of political parties and assistance to the Election Commission (EC) in its tasks of preparing the voters’ list and chalking out the roadmap for the parliamentary elections. It is evident, however, that in the manner of accomplishing each of these objectives, the Government has secured vastly augmented powers, and is seeking to impose a radical transformation in the country’s politics.

The manipulative use of the Special Powers Act (SPA), 1974, by the Interim Administration, to detain politicians, businessmen and journalists has evoked harsh criticism. According to the Cabinet Committee on Law and Order, between January 11, 2007, and the first week of January 2008, a total of 440,684 people had been arrested on various grounds by the law-enforcement agencies. This included close to 200 politicians and businessmen who are under prosecution for involvement in corruption. Among them are the country’s foremost leaders and members of their families, including former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina, on charges of extorting Bangladesh Taka (BDT) 29.6 million from a private company, and Khaleda Zia, for tax evasion. Other prominent individuals who have been prosecuted include former Minister of State Lutfozzaman Babar; Khaleda Zia’s son and BNP General Secretary Tarique Rahman; former BNP minister Brigadier General (Retired) Hannan Shah; former BNP State Minister for Civil Aviation, Mir Mohammad Nasiruddin; AL General Secretary Abdul Jalil; former BNP Minister Altaf Hossain Chowdhury; former-AL Parliamentarian Fazlur Rahman Patal; former-BNP Parliamentarian Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim; Partex Group Chairman M.A. Hashem; and former Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry President, Abdul Awal Mintoo.

Similarly, under the programme for carrying out reforms within the political parties, immense encouragement has been provided by the Interim Administration to potential dissident groups within leading parties. Such steps appeared to have been based on the presumption that, given the autocratic ways both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia had run their parties, their ‘in prison’-status would provide a fillip to the potential dissidents within the parties to take over the reins, thereby heralding a new age in Bangladeshi politics. However, such reform processes stagnated after initial signs of success in which the dissidents threatened to banish both the women leaders to the pages of history. Both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina have influential coteries within their parties, and these have been successful in resisting such moves. The Government, on the other hand, is yet to lift the restrictions on political activity in the country and has not started a process of dialogue with the political parties regarding the impending polls. Differences of opinion among the Advisors in the Interim Administration over allowing political activity by lifting Emergency provisions led to the resignation of five Advisors within a space of two weeks in December 2007 and January 2008.

Indications emerging in March 2007 suggested that the ‘comprehensive electoral reforms’, including the preparation of the new voters’ list and identity cards for all above 18 years of age, would only commence in July 2007. According to sources in the Election Commission, the massive exercise involving about 85 million voters would require at least a year to be completed. Voter registration, in fact, started only in November and till mid-January about 26 million voters had been issued photo identity cards. Rectifying the last voters list, which included over 10 million fake and duplicate voters, is an enormous task and is unlikely to be completed within the scheduled timeframe. In fact, the Government’s earlier decision to hold elections to all local government bodies before the parliamentary polls has already been shelved. The current plan of holding city corporation elections ‘before the parliamentary polls’ is also likely to meet the same fate.

While the Interim Government’s anti-militancy, anti-corruption and political reforms measures have secured some popular support, its performance on the economic front has been far less satisfactory. Since the declaration of the Emergency, annual inflation of the consumers’ index has climbed steadily and by November 2007 (the latest available figures) had reached a 17-year high of 11.21 percent. Acute shortages of supply of food grains have contributed to soaring food prices and the Government has been able to do little to address the crisis. The World Bank’s 'Global Economic Prospects 2008' report has projected Bangladesh's economic growth at 5.5 per cent for the current fiscal year due to what it describes as 'political tensions, severe flooding and cyclone'. The estimate is lower than the Bangladesh Bank’s projection of economic growth at 6 to 6.2 per cent.

Time appears to have stood frozen in Bangladesh through 2007, a remarkable change from the previous turbulent years. But each passing day brings harsh reminders of life under a military administration, with restrictions mounting on several fronts. The people have been told that the current phase of ‘discipline’ is necessary to restore the integrity of democratic processes, and the people have endured the authoritarian ways of the Interim Government in the hope that a more unsullied democracy will shortly be restored. It can only be hoped that the future rewards their patience and their acquiescence.

The peaceful Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan was rocked by a series of explosions between 11.10am and 2.10pm at four different locations, all in the South Western region of the country, including one in the capital Thimpu, on January 20, 2008. While no loss of life was reported, a woman sustained splinter injuries.

While the low-intensity explosions constitute no significant threat to the country’s security, they are disturbing, particularly in the context of a country that is currently making its transition from monarchy to parliamentary democracy – the first general elections, to choose 47 candidates for Bhutan’s National Assembly, the lower House of Parliament, will be held on March 24, 2008. Two parties — the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT, Bhutan Harmony Party) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) — will contest the elections that will formally end absolute monarchy in the country.

The first blast occurred at 11:10am near the vegetable market in Samtse. The second blast took place at 11:45am in Thimpu town. At 1:20pm, a third blast occurred near the gate of the Tala Guest House at Gedu in the Chukha District. At 2:10pm the fourth blast occurred at Dagapela in the Dagana District, where a second device, which failed to explode, was found in the same area. While there was no injury to any person or damage to property in the blasts in Samtse and Dagapela, one woman suffered splinter injuries in the blast at Gedu. The explosion in the Thimpu town shattered the window panes of buildings. In an e-mail declaration, the newly formed United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan (URFB) claimed responsibility for these blasts. The declaration, credited to URFB’s ‘commander-in-chief’ Karma, stated that the group was formed on April 12, 2007.

Meanwhile, the Royal Bhutanese Police (RBP) claimed that any one of the three Nepal-based organizations could have been responsible for the attacks: the Bhutan Tiger Force, the Bhutan Maoist Party and the Communist Party of Bhutan. Open source information, however, indicates that all these groups are, in fact, a single organisation – the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) [BCP (MLM)] of which Bhutan Tiger Force (BTF) is the armed wing.

These explosions have occurred after more than a year since the last blast in the country. On December 2, 2006, four persons, including three Indian nationals, were injured in a bomb blast in Phuntsholing town. No one claimed responsibility for the attack. Although the disruptive forces failed to carry out any violent action in 2007, there were a few attempts which were successfully foiled by the security forces:

August 10: RBP personnel prevented a blast by detecting an explosive device in a five-storey building opposite Kuenga Hotel in Phuntsholing.

May 28: An improvised explosive device was discovered below a culvert about four kilometres from Phuntsholing on the Phuntsholing-Thimpu highway.

April 23: A bomb, believed to have been planted by anti-monarchy rebels, was recovered and subsequently defused near a bridge in Phuntsholing, approximately 180 kilometres south of the capital Thimpu, and close to the Indian border. The BTF and the hitherto unknown Bhutan Revolutionary Youth claimed responsibility for planting the device. The RBP, however, blamed the BTF for planting the explosive device.

The BCP (MLM) was reportedly formed in the United Nations Refugee Camps in eastern Nepal and is largely comprised of Bhutanese refugees of Nepali origin. The BCP (MLM) brought out its first Press Release, signed by ‘Vikalpa’ as ‘general secretary’ through the Website of the Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-Maoist) on April 22, 2003. After its formation in Nepal, the group has reportedly strengthened bases inside Bhutan. The group has youth, peasant and student wings that have begun distributing pamphlets and posters even in urban centres like Thimpu, Paro and Haa.

Banned by the Bhutanese Government, the BCP (MLM) has close ties with the CPN-Maoist. The major demands of the BCP (MLM) include the early repatriation of the refugees to Bhutan and the declaration of Bhutan as a ‘sovereign democracy’. The URFB has a similar set of demands.

On May 25, 2007, RBP personnel arrested 30 people, including three students, who had joined the BCP (MLM), in Samtse District. During the Court proceedings in the cases registered against these persons, it was observed that the accused had been in touch with cadres of the CPN-Maoist. The Police stated that the accused were engaged in seditious meetings, held in Katarey and Ugyentse, to recruit more people and collect donations to finance subversive activities. Their plans were to create awareness of the communist ideology and provide training in arms and explosives to start an armed rebellion against the Government, to disrupt the peace and stability and the democratisation process taking place in the country. The accused were also allegedly providing support to the Ngolops (Bhutanese refugees of Nepali origin residing in Nepal) in their seditious activities against the State.

The unresolved issue of Ngolops remains a critical problem for Bhutan. Over 105,000 Bhutanese refugees reside in seven camps in the eastern Districts of Nepal since the ethnic exodus that followed the implementation of Bhutan’s Citizenship Act of 1985 and the subsequent nation-wide Census of 1988. The Bhutan Government has tended to resist all repatriation because most of the refugees are of Nepali origin, and this is seen as creating a 'demographic imbalance' in some areas of the thinly-populated country, as well as a threat to the Monarchy. While growing international pressure has forced Bhutan to accept the idea of repatriation of some refugees, non-Bhutanese and Bhutanese with criminal and subversive records will certainly be excluded, accounting for a sizeable and potentially volatile chunk of the refugee population. Bhutan also fears that the repatriated groups may be 'infected' by the Nepalese Maoists. The Bhutanese Home Secretary, Dasho Penden Wangchuk, stated on September 23, 2006, that the growing nexus between people in the camps in eastern Nepal, the Maoists and Indian Left Wing Extremists would have far-reaching impact on the region’s security. Wangchuk noted: "It is a confirmed fact that there is today a growing nexus between Maoists and the people in the camps in eastern Nepal … We also have information confirming radical elements from the camps in Nepal having received armed training from the Maoists."

Meanwhile, there are reports that almost half of the Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal have opted for a new life in the United States (US) and have applied for resettlement in the US, after the US Government’s decision to offer a new home and life to the refugees who were evicted from Bhutan because of their Nepali origin. The first batch of refugees was scheduled to arrive in the US in January 2008. Other countries like Canada, Australia and Denmark have also offered resettlement in their respective countries. 'It is our hope that in 2008 more than 13,000 refugees will be resettled from Nepal,' said the American Ambassador to Nepal, Nancy J. Powell, in a statement issued by the US Embassy in Kathmandu on January 16, 2008.

However, the BTF has opposed this ‘third country settlement’. On December 13, 2007, the BTF shot at and injured a refugee, identified as Subba, at Beldangi I camp near Sangam Chowk in Damak, Nepal. Two others, C. L. Thapa and D. B. Moktan, who were with Subba escaped the shooting. Later, claiming responsibility for the attack, the BCP (MLM) ‘chairman’ Surya declared: "The resettlement in America was a plan to obstruct the repatriation of the Bhutanese to their homeland and this action (shooting) was carried to foil the resettlement." He also warned that "Anyone supporting and advocating for the third country resettlement would face similar consequence (sic)." Earlier, on June 7, 2007, the BTF warned the refugees not to support third country settlement. The group reportedly pasted pamphlets and posters in the Jhapa and Morang camps in Nepal, which declared that resettling refugees in third countries was against the refugee's movement of respectful return to their country and was meant to ‘brush aside’ the existence of refugees. These acts seeking to disrupt third country settlement and whipping up sentiments underlines the BCP-MLM’s devisive agenda and their principal worry about the prospective loss of their cadres – since Ngolops provide the recruiting base for the radical group.

Amidst all this, Bhutan remains en route to democracy. Elections to the 47-member National Assembly (Lower House of Parliament), to effect the transition to parliamentary democracy from the existing monarchy, are scheduled to be held on March 24, 2008. Earlier, on December 31, 2007, the country voted for 15 of the 20-member Nation Council (Upper House of Parliament). Two new political parties formed in 2007 are in the fray. The DPT is believed to be the frontrunner but expects a strong challenge from the PDP. Both the parties draw their leaders from the bureaucracy and other professional groups. The country's first elected Prime Minister is expected to assume office a day after the elections, Chief Election Commissioner Kunzang Wangdi disclosed. Under a Draft Constitution, the King will remain as head of State after the vote. However, the Parliament will have the power to impeach the 27-year-old monarch, Jigme Keshar Namgyal Wangchuck, by a two-thirds vote.

Bhutan has largely persisted as the only fortunate exception in an otherwise violence-torn South Asia. It remains to be seen whether the ‘land of the thunder dragon’ will continue to abide in peace after the transition to democracy and the incursions of the incipient Maoist movement into this ‘last Shangrila’.

23 January, 2008 Around the world the nature of membership to political parties seems to be divided into many categories, two of them broadly contrasting. In communist countries a party member seems to “submit” himself or herself to the party in his or her political as well as personal life. The member pays dues and obeys party instructions. In the west, membership seems to mean that the voter shares the ideology or political philosophy of a party and votes for the party but does not sign up or pay fees.

Then there are other supporters who lend their business and other infrastructure to help promote party candidates and party activities. In the west, it is common that high profile or wealthy supporters organize dinners where people pay large amounts to meet politicians informally. These are prominent people who, in some parts of the world, are suspected of contributing unknown and unacknowledged amounts of cash and other assets.

In Bhutan, from a purely lay interpretation, a party member seems to mean the people who register as a party for two reasons: one to support the party with cash and other resources; the other to help organize and take part in party activities. We are talking about the members other than the political candidates themselves.

Our two parties, however, are recruiting membership beyond these interpretations. The network of tshogpas, meaning party workers, is becoming large and penetrative, in both urban and rural areas. And that invites speculation because many such members do not fit into the normal profile of a party member.

In the absence of party manifestos such a membership drive could take on a feudalistic approach where the loyalty of largely illiterate members could be traded off for patronage. In our case we know that, even when the manifestos are issued, they will not be widely read and understood.

The electorate can be divided without any real political basis. Which could lead to many problems including regionalism as well as religious and ethnic division. If someone from one party does not purchase something he needs from a shop owned by a member of another party, both are losers.

A more immediate problem is that, if the populace is signed up in large numbers as party members, they are being deprived of the freedom of choice as voters. As members they are bound to the party and have no opportunity to understand the beauty of diversity that democracy represents.

In terms of party membership, therefore, our political parties must be urged to limit their membership drives to people who will have clear-cut responsibilities within the party. Let the average citizen be a voter who has been given the sacred responsibility to vote.

MALE: The Special Majlis passed amendment to the Chapter on the People's Majlis which says that the Majlis is composed of 2 members from the 21 administrative sectors (20 atolls plus Male’) plus an additional member for every additional 5000 people in the administrative sector. This was passed on January 22 during the vote taken on those articles of the Chapter on the People’s Majlis that were not previously put to vote.

The voting was on the re drafts proposed by the Drafting Committee and the amendments put forward by the Members to those re drafts. In this regard the amendment was passed as proposed by Addu Atoll member Mohamed Aslam. This amendment was supported by Husnu Al Suood MP for Addu as well.

“The composition of the Majlis shall be determined as follows, 2 members for the first 5000 people of each administrative sector or two members for each administrative sector which has a population of 5000. If the registered population of the administrative sector exceeds 5000, then an additional member shall be elected for each additional 5000.”

This is a very important change that is being introduced to the political system of the Maldives. When the amendment is in force, then the Majlis, which currently have 2 members from each atoll, 2 members from Male’ and the 8 Members appointed by the President, will have approximately 72 elected Members. The new Majlis shall not have any appointed Members of the President. Further the Majlis established under the new constitution shall be responsible for bringing the necessary amendments to the constitution, formulating legislations, to check and monitor the affairs of the government and the President as well as to make the government and the president accountable in accordance with the constitution in place. Further once the new constitution comes in to force, there shall be no Special Majlis to amend the constitution.

Speaking during the debate time MP for Fuvahmulak Mohamed Ibrahim Didi said that as there will be a lot of disputes and difficulties in the forming of electoral areas and as such not the best and most appropriate way. Some members are of the opinion that difficulties will be faced during the election process due to the way the Majlis is composed. They claim that instead of 5000, an additional member should be elected for each additional 10000 people. Also instead of further distributing the administrative sectors to electoral areas, members should be elected for the entire administrative sector and the number of candidates can be determined based on the population and they can be elected based on the number of votes received.

85 Members attended the Majlis session before break time and 98 members attended after the break time. Yesterday’s session was chaired by Speaker Qasim Ibrahim.