The conventional narrative highlights the drastic and positive change in recent months and years. The war has ended. The elections went off peacefully. The Assembly is the most representative house in Nepal's history, with 33 percent women, 34 percent Madhesis and almost 38 percent ethnic groups. Monarchy has been abolished in what was visibly a seamless transition, with the former King now tucked away in the capital's outskirts.

But this is where the happy narrative hits a roadblock. For it ignores the imperfections of the peace process. There has been little discussion on how to transform the politico-military structure of the Maoists into a political party. The narrative ignores the gradual weakening of the state and growing economic crises. And it misses out on the present political impasse.

In the aftermath of the elections, the politics of consensus among the major forces has given way to the politics of numbers, leading to confrontation at the top. Normal competitive democratic processes are proving to be an obstacle to the consensual peace process. The Maoists emerged as the single largest force after the elections, but they have been unable to carve a consensus and form a Government. The other parties lost, but are pretending to have won by refusing to give way and insisting on an almost equal 'power sharing' deal with the former rebels. The Madhesi block, especially the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, with 52 seats, has emerged as the key tilting force in Nepali politics. Shifting alignments at the top have added to existing mistrust and made the task of forming a national government more difficult. And the ground situation is characterised by soft authoritarianism and semi-anarchy.

The election mandate was clearly for a Maoist-led consensus Government. The former rebels won the most seats, but were still short of a majority. Given that, prior to elections, all parties had committed themselves to work together irrespective of results, and the Interim Constitution formally stipulated that the politics of consensus should continue, it was hoped that they would come to an amicable compromise. But the shock election results upset calculations and derailed past agreements.

This stalemate primarily stems from differing interpretations of the election mandate, the internal tensions in all parties, and the widespread suspicions among mainstream parties and sections of civil society and the media that, once the Maoists come to power, it will be difficult to dislodge them. As a result, we are constantly witness to new demands and an appeal for 'power sharing'.

The Nepali Congress (NC) has found it hard to accept defeat and its status as a junior partner to the Maoists. For months after the polls, Girija Prasad Koirala was encouraged by sections of the state – the Army and the bureaucracy – to make a claim for the President’s post, as they saw him as the sole force capable of countering the Maoists. He calculated this was his final opportunity and, if he did not get the seat, he and his family would risk being marginalised from both national politics as well as his own party, where the Sher Bahadur Deuba faction has emerged stronger.

The Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) faces its most serious existential crisis. The UML leaders realise that the Maoists have captured the Left space in the country, while the NC will gradually become the rallying point for right-wing consolidation. In such a polarised atmosphere, the space for a centrist party that claims to be Communist is minimal. UML cadres are already shifting to the Maoists, albeit gradually. To keep their flock together and energise the party machinery, the new General Secretary, Jhalanath Khanal, set up a youth force on the lines of the Maoist Young Communist League (YCL). The party is also taking an anti-Madhesi line in order to win the support of the Pahadis and Tharus in the Tarai. The UML has continued to be ideologically unclear, while operationally it has swung from supporting the NC to becoming an ally of the Maoists, and then getting back to the NC.

The Madhesi parties have 82 seats in the house, with the Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum as the largest force. They felt alienated when the three big parties – NC, UML, and the Maoists – continued their negotiations on power-sharing, while barely consulting them. To assert their presence, the Madhesi leaders obstructed CA proceedings for more than two weeks in early July, demanding that agreements signed with them be incorporated as a constitutional amendment. Madhesi parties are a conglomeration of leaders of different political backgrounds and ideological hues. While some former Left activists favour a tactical alliance with the Maoists, citing their similar positions on federalism and autonomy, others prefer a ‘democratic’ alliance with the NC claiming that, in the long-term, the Maoists are the key adversary.

For most part, the Maoists remained inflexible. Buoyed and secure in their electoral success, the former rebels did give into a demand by the other parties that they amend the Constitution in order to bring down the numbers required to oust a Government. But they took a firm stand opposing Koirala as President, realising that it would lead to another power centre. While others saw the head of state as balancing the Maoists, the latter conceived of the post as merely ceremonial and wanted a meek President who would play ball with them. The trust gap between the Maoists and other parties has only increased, because of the inconsistent statements of the Maoist top leadership.

What all this resulted in was a deadlock that lasted three months. Koirala asked for the presidency, the Maoists opposed it. The Maoists then weaned away the UML from the NC by offering it the presidency instead. Koirala had no choice but to withdraw. But differences cropped up between the Maoists and UML on who would become President. Jhalanath Khanal wanted to kick his predecessor Madhav Nepal up by making him the President, thus removing a potential rival in the party. The Maoists made it clear they would not accept Nepal as he had lost from two seats and insisted that the seat go to a person from a marginalised community. They went back to their original proposal to make veteran republican Madhesi leader Ram Raja Prasad Singh the head of state – they had pushed his name because he is sympathetic to them and also because the Madhesi parties would have no choice but to support him.

Though the two sides were engaged in intense consultations, the alliance broke down last week. The UML version, widespread in the Nepali media, is that India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) engineered a split in the Maoist-UML alliance because it was apprehensive of Left unity. As proof, they cite the presence of the RAW station chief at Prachanda’s house immediately before the alliance broke down. The Maoists admit they have been in touch with Indian ‘agents’ but rubbish the allegation. They claimed that UML’s unwillingness to opt for a name other than Madhav Nepal, and its insistence on key portfolios, led to a breakdown. A sullen UML went back to the NC.

The Maoists risked alienating the UML because they were confident about having the numbers in the house with the support of the MJF. In a sudden turn-around though, the MJF shifted loyalties and backed the NC-UML alliance. MJF leader Upendra Yadav claimed that the Maoists had refused to support his candidate as Vice President. The ‘Left-democratic’ alliance of the NC, UML, and MJF decided to back the NC candidate for President, the MJF candidate for Vice President, and the UML candidate for CA Chairman. This alliance has been successful, cornering all three seats.

So what we have now is a polarisation between political forces, with Maoists on one side and the key non-Maoist forces on the other. Most leaders in NC, UML and MJF have said that, though the alliance will continue, the Maoists have the first right to lead the Government, as that is the mandate of the election and they are willing to support it. Others in the alliance would rather keep the Maoists out. Koirala is reportedly still harbouring dreams of becoming PM and the Sher Bahadur Deuba faction – close to the US and the Army – is viscerally anti-Maoist. The conservative faction of the UML, led by K.P. Oli, has said that UML should get to head the Government; and some MJF leaders believe that they have a fair chance of taking the PM’s post if the Maoists can be kept out.

The Maoists have said formally that they will stay out of Government after their loss in the presidential election. But this is seen as an initial bargaining position to extract the best deal in terms of portfolios and get a guarantee that their Government would not be ousted in a few months. There are internal divisions in the Maoists too, with some arguing it would be more beneficial to stay out while others assert that it is their responsibility to head the Government.

Negotiations in Kathmandu are presently hovering around the contours of the next Government. The big question is whether it will be a non-Maoist formation, a Maoist minority Government, or a Maoist-led national unity Government.

Even as Kathmandu politics continues, there are worrying signs out in the Districts and villages. Soft authoritarianism and semi-anarchy seem to prevail in most parts of the country.

For one, the Maoists are consolidating legitimately, with no political opposition. They have substantive pockets of support, they have a coercive apparatus, they have a popular mandate, they are seen as agents of change by the marginalised, and sooner or later, they will have control of the state. In fact, the Police is already playing ball with Maoist activists in the Districts.

The other parties do not seem to have learnt from the debacle during the polls. They are not making the effort to revive their organisation, pick up popular issues, and challenge the Maoist project by raising a constructive agenda. Democracy faces danger not from the authoritarian impulses of the Maoists, but the lack of serious political opposition to them on the ground.

Instead of engaging in petty Kathmandu-centred politics, it would be far more useful for NC and UML leaders to go back to the Districts and figure out ways to revive their machinery. They prefer hiding under the pretext that Maoists do not allow other party workers to function. While this is undoubtedly true in some cases, it obscures the fact that it is more possible for the parties to go back to the villages now than it was three years back. It also shows the unwillingness and inability of these parties to stand up for their political principles, and use a sympathetic media and existing national and international human rights institutions to expand the democratic space. In the absence of motivation and direction from the top, the village level cadre decide that it makes more sense to be inert than confront the Maoists.

If the Maoists decide to stay out of Government, claiming they have lost the ‘moral right’ to lead it after the loss in the presidential polls, they will consolidate further in the countryside. They will monopolise the opposition space, while playing the 'victim card'. The Maoists will use their formidable organisation and propaganda machine to convey that they have been deprived of their right to lead the Government, while exposing the failure of the old faces in the new Government. They will be in the happy position of having power at the village level, numbers in the House to influence the Constitution-making exercise, but no responsibility in Government.

If the Maoists do join the Government, they will use state resources to expand the party organisation and cater to populist aspirations. A stark example is the way they used the ministries in the Interim Government to grow, while others used them to make money for personal purposes. The Maoists had control of the Local Development Ministry, thus taking control of the state apparatus on the ground; they were in charge of Physical Works, which allowed them to cater to infrastructure needs in a selective manner; the Ministry of Forests was used to collect resources for the party; the Ministry of Information gave them control of the state media; and the Ministry of Social Welfare allowed them to exert influence on International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) and the vast network of national non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Combine the ineptness, factionalism and corruption of the other parties with the ruthlessness and commitment of the former rebels, and it is clear that the Maoists will have virtual political hegemony in most parts of the country.

The other worrying sign is that of growing anarchy. There has been no Government at the top since April, leading to lack of redressal of the spiraling inflation and economic crises. The official budget has not been presented even though the new fiscal year has begun. There is a severe fuel shortage, especially in the capital, leading to serpentine queues in front of petrol pumps.

Street protests are the most frequently used mechanism of expressing grievances, bringing life in Kathmandu to a halt. In the past month, students have protested against textbook shortages or to demand concessions on public transport. Transporters have protested against fuel hike. Maoists and student organisations have recently got together to rebel against the Vice President Parmanand Jha taking oath in Hindi, accusing him of being anti-national.

The problem is not that various interest groups have grievances; the problem is that in the absence of a non-violent, democratic system to redress these grievances, streets become the site of all contestation. Blackmail becomes an accepted political tool. And the Government, in most cases, succumbs. The optimists may like to see this as the responsiveness of the system. But this is a vicious cycle, where the weak state shows it is unable to withstand any kind of pressure, becoming even more discredited in the process.

In recent weeks, there have been two rebellions in Police camps – one in the Armed Police Force and the other at a civilian Police post – in western Nepal. Junior Policemen rebelled against mistreatment by seniors, poor quality of food and bad pay. They held officers hostage and presented demands to the Government. In one case, the Government gave into all demands and only weeks later took some action against the rebelling cops. The signs of mutiny, even within the state security establishment, points to how crippled the state in Nepal is, and how badly the Police needs reform.

Anarchy is also manifested in the complete lawlessness in parts of the Tarai. There is no political direction to the bureaucracy. The Police do not act against crime because most criminals have political cover and the culture of impunity is rampant. The Police decide to share in the loot instead of enforcing law and order.

A critical few weeks lie ahead in Nepal. The shape of the new Government will have direct impact on the peace process, issues of governance, the state-Madhes gap, and whether the democratic space will expand or shrink on the ground.

[South Asian Intelligence Review]

[South Asian Intelligence Review]