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News
Briefs
The LTTE in Crisis
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(Afghanistan and
Myanmar in the
map are not members of SAARC)
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Bruce
Fein challenges Bernard Goonetilleke to open debate in the U.S
BY
SATHEESAN KUMAARAN (IDN) *
Who
could have seen this coming? Former
U.S. Associate Attorney General Bruce Fein has called upon an eminent
Sri Lankan diplomat and present ambassador to the U.S. to an open debate
at the National Press Club on American soil. Does the call challenge the
intellectuality of our Sri Lankan generations?
Will Sri Lankan Ambassador to the US Bernard Goonetilleke accept
this call to show that Sri Lankans are prepared for any challenge?
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Bruce
Fein’s challenge reflects his intellectual ability to interact with a
powerful, career diplomat by modern Sri Lankan standards, and has come
in the wake of the U.S. recognizing the unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo from Serbia in the post-Cold War era leading to
the further degradation of the relations between Russia and the U.S.
Fein’s
call for an open debate is like a heavy weight boxing champion thinking
that he cannot be defeated in the ring. Will the Sri Lankan ambassador
accept the challenge or will he meekly retreat from the debate with his
tail between legs? If
Goonetilleke rejects the call, Sri Lanka will see it as a betrayal.
One should remember that Sri Lanka once produced excellent
analysts and intellectuals who contributed in the academic and public
service circles, especially within the in
the south and southeast Asia region.
In this context alone, Goonetilleke should accept the challenge,
and demonstrate Sri Lankan prowess in external relations and assertive
diplomacy. Fein has given
the ambassador the opportunity to pick any date in March of this year,
and the Sri Lankan government, if necessary, must even allocate funds to
invest in relevant resources on diplomacy, history and geography of Asia
and the Americas to help him prepare for the debate.
The
call for the debate was pertinent.
Goonetilleke’s presentation on 25 January 2008 and the
commentary that appeared on 17 February 2008 in the commentary section
of the Washington Times entitled, “Tamil
Homeland Fantasy”, must have prompted Fein to speak out against
Goonetilleke. Previous
ambassadorial statements have presented the world with many factual
errors about Sri Lanka’s history and the principles of the UN Charter.
Goonetilleke claimed that the Tamils did not have the fundamental
principles to be recognized as a unique nation and state. Yet, according
to the UN Charter’s clearly stated principles, Tamils have justified
their claim to be recognized as a unique nation and their eligibility
for self-determination.
Sri
Lankan politicians and diplomats should remember the failure of the
Thimpu Talks in 1984 as a consequence of the Sri Lankan government
refusing to accept the fundamental demands of Tamil representatives at
the talks. The Tamils put
forward basic principles, which included the recognition of Tamil
homeland, the recognition of Tamil people as a nationality and the
recognition of the Tamil people's right to national self-determination.
Rather, India, which hosted the talks between the Tamils and
Sinhala leaderships at Thimpu in Bhutan, came up with a different set of
responses in not accepting the demands of Tamils saying that, while
recognizing the northern and eastern provinces as areas of historical
habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking people, the Tamils have also "…at
all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic
groups." The Sri
Lankan politicians and ambassadors should know the differences between
the statements above. By
citing the Northern and Eastern provinces as Tamil homeland, they gave
importance to other ethnic groups.
“Other ethnic groups” referring specifically to the
Sinhalese. The ambiguity was intended. The disenfranchisement of nearly a million plantation Tamils
in 1948 and the escalation of planned Sinhala colonisation after
independence shattered all wishes of the Tamils to co-exist. Tamils have
blamed the Sinhala leadership for destroying their native habitat in
their traditional villages, especially in the east of Sri Lanka, which
continues to happen today. No-one
can refute the fact that the north and east of Sri Lanka were and are
the traditional homeland of Tamil-speaking people.
This territory is well-defined and has been inhabited by the
Tamil-speaking people from time immemorial. The
Tamils of Sri Lankan-origin are not claiming the Upcountry region of Sri
Lanka as their homeland because these areas are considered Sinhala
homeland. No-one can argue
that, since Tamils live in the hill country, the land is the traditional
homeland of the Tamils. The
indigenous Tamils of the island have lived in the northern and eastern
parts of the island from the very beginning of their existence in Sri
Lanka.
Thus
the Tamils have fulfilled all the principles stated in the UN Charter to
be a unique nation. The
concept of nation is psychology, but statehood is the legality.
Statehood will be legally recognised once the majority of the
members of the UN with the support of UN’s Security Council declare it
a legal state. Kosovo is a
unique example to cite because Kosovo has declared independence
unilaterally from Serbia. Most
powerful countries, such as the U.S., have recognized Kosovo as a
sovereign state. With a
population of over 3.2 million, twice the size of Kosovo, Tamils satisfy
the basic criteria to be recognized as an independent state of their
traditional homeland (northeast). This, indeed, will be part of Fein’s
argument.
Meanwhile,
Goonetilleke claims that the Tamils live in the Sinhala south and that,
while the LTTE have control, no one can live in peace.
This is a horrendous misguided error on the part of this
so-called senior career Sri Lankan diplomat.
Senior foreign delegates visited the government-controlled areas
northeast of Sri Lanka and the LTTE-controlled territories.
These diplomats reported on the great administration of the
LTTE-controlled areas, and many sad stories -- disappearances, rapes,
lootings and killings occurring on a daily basis – in the
government-controlled areas. Goonetilleke
may not have heard these stories because he lived a cloistered life far
removed from reality, and it is pathetic that he was named a senior
person in the Sri Lankan peace coordinating committee.
It is baffling as to how such people like Goonetilleke could
objectively explain the history of Tamil struggle and their history to
an international audience let alone to the common Sinhala people in the
south. It is pathetic that
he claims that the Tamils have no traditional homeland and Tamils have
no grievances whatsoever, except the Tamil terrorism (LTTE). He is used
to citing the FBI’s report comparing the LTTE with other international
outfits like Al Qaeda, Hezbollah or Hamas. His lack of knowledge about
India’s history is evidenced by his claims that India’s official
language is Hindi and that India does not recognize the other languages.
In fact, Indian states and the central government agreed when the
central government granted autonomy for the states through
quasi-federalism, that the states would have their own language besides
English. While the central government recognizes all state languages,
they would employ Hindi and English as official languages.
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, West Bengal, Assam
and Punjab are a few of the Indian states who have their own language of
administration – in addition to English. There is no Hindi domination
of these states at all. If
the central government sends out mail to the people of these states,
they address the letters in English, rather than Hindi.
These states send their MPs to the upper and lower houses in New
Delhi to represent their states, where they speak English.
Although, Sri Lanka recognized Sinhala, Tamil and English as
official languages of government in Colombo, the governments in Colombo
had directed their departments to write letters in Sinhala even when
addressing them to the people who live in Tamil homeland.
These Tamils do not have any knowledge of Sinhala at all.
Contrary to what Goonetilleke has said, there are very few Tamil
officers in the Sri Lankan armed forces and police force.
On
the question of standardisation of University intake on a racial basis,
even an anti-LTTE activist like Ratnajeevan H. Hoole, who is attached to
the Drexel University in Philadelphia, has written a response to
Goonetilleke’s commentary that: “Goonetilleke
says weighting examinations was never intended to discriminate against
us Tamils. I took the common Advanced Level exam in 1969 and was
admitted to the engineering faculty. The government then redid the
admissions after adding some 28 marks to the four-subject aggregate of
Sinhalese students. I lost my seat. They effectively claimed that the
son of a Sinhalese minister in an elite Colombo school was disadvantaged
vis-à-vis a Tamil tea-plucker's son. Unable to defend this, in 1973
they created the statistical scheme equating Tamil and Sinhalese
averages with regional preferences to which the ambassador refers.”
Goonetilleke
argues that Sri Lanka’s judicial system embraces all sectors of Sri
Lankan society. He is
trying to please his masters in Colombo by conveying these stories to
the men and women of western countries who have either little or no
knowledge of Sri Lanka. This
is totally dishonest. Senior men like Goonetilleke should maintain their
credibility by speaking the truth.
He has randomly picked recent court cases and claimed that the
Sri Lankan judicial system treated everyone equally regardless of
ethnicity or religion. The opinion of the Tamils is that the Sri Lankan
judicial system treats the Tamils as second class citizens and, so, they
have no confidence in the justice system.
The criminal justice system has never been able to punish those
culprits who raped and murdered the Tamils in broad daylight in Colombo
or in the northeast of the island.
Tamils cannot even approach the police stations in the south to
lodge complaints against Sinhala criminals.
In return, the officers in charge will book these innocent
complainants with false allegations. Fearing police retaliation, the
innocent Tamils do not file complaints with the police.
Besides, if the
Tamils took the issues all the way to the courts, these Tamils would
either be abducted by the so-called ‘white
van’ abductors, or be jailed by the police for
alleged LTTE connections. This is the reality on ground in Sri Lanka.
The
distorted statements by senior diplomats definitely will hurt the
feelings of Tamils and others who are interested the minority rights and
human values. It is easy to
make people believe a lie but the truth has to be told a thousand times
before they believe it.
Are
Sri Lankans willing to expose the state they represent by denying the
calls for an open debate? Sri
Lankans will definitely feel betrayed if their diplomats, politicians or
senior statesmen who fail to defend their country. Fein’s call is a
challenge for the diplomats or politicians in Sri Lanka to prove whether
Sri Lanka is waging a war against terrorists or against freedom
fighters. This could be the
last chance for Sri Lanka to have an open debate in an international
forum. Of course, the Sri
Lankan government in the past had a Tamil, Lakshman Kadirgamar, from the
Tamil homeland as the foreign minister of Sri Lanka and with excellent
speaking and diplomacy skills, but it is impossible for the current
Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama to rise up to it.
Sri
Lankans from within and outside of Sri Lanka eagerly await Sri Lanka’s
response. Sri Lankans want
to see whether these diplomats will further degrade the prestige of Sri
Lanka in the eyes of foreigners. Failure
to attend the debate will be an embarrassment and slap in the face for
all Sri Lankans. Are Sri
Lankans ready to show their chins to receive the slaps from a foreigner?
Make a wise choice and prove that Sri Lankans are no less
intellectual than any of other developed nations.
[Source:
The Tamil Mirror
]
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*
Satheesan Kumaaran
holds B.Sc. (Biology), Honours BA (Political Science) and MA in
Integrated Studies with the specialization in International
Law and International Relations. This was first published in
The Tamil Mirror. E-Mail: satheesan_kumaaran@yahoo.com.
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The LTTE in Crisis
Guest Writer:
G.H. Peiris
Professor Emeritus of the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka
In the past few weeks
there have been many media reports that point to the prevalence of
confusion and disarray among the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE/Tigers)
in the face of heavy losses inflicted by the armed forces of the
Government of Sri Lanka. Apart from many references to injury sustained by
the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in the course of an aerial
bombardment in November 2007, there was some speculation that he may even
have died. [Claims of Prabhakaran’s death may be set to rest after
Prabhakaran’s ‘public appearance’ at the funeral of the pro-LTTE
Tamil National Alliance Member of Parliament, P. Sivanesan, in the
rebel-held Wanni area, of which the LTTE released photographs on March 9,
2008]. The specificities that embellish these reports, though ignored by
spokesmen for the LTTE, have been refuted with disdain by several pro-LTTE
writers. Given the questionable credibility of ‘news’ originating from
either side of the great divide, it has seldom been possible to sort out
the truth from fiction in the stories on the confrontational aspects of
the Sri Lankan conflict. What can, consequently, be attempted is, first,
to contextualise the recent surge of media attention on turbulences in the
shrinking Tiger habitat of the ‘Vanni’ in northern Sri Lanka, without
speculating on whether its leader is dead or dying or hibernating prior to
a deadly leap at the jugular, and then, to synthesise the information on
what prevails at present, extractable from sources less contaminated by
propaganda objectives.
In the chequered history
of the LTTE spanning the past three decades during which Prabhakaran has
held sway as its supreme leader, there have been several spells over which
its insurrectionary capacity suffered serious setbacks. Prominent among
such recessions were: the brief eclipse of the LTTE in the aftermath of
the Indian peace-keeping intervention in 1987; the worldwide anti-Tiger
revulsion evoked by the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi in 1991; the strategic losses consequent upon its expulsion
by the Sri Lankan armed forces from the Jaffna peninsula in 1995; the
constraining effects on its international operations generated by the
global tide of hostility towards terrorism following the al-Qaeda attack
on the United States in 2001; and, more far-reaching in impact than any
other, the internal revolt led by ‘Colonel Karuna’ in March 2004. The
impression conveyed by the experiences in each of these episodes, however,
is that the LTTE possessed the inner resilience and the external support
required for recovery, if not entirely unscathed, at least with sufficient
strength to persist with its campaign of warfare and terror. By contrast,
the losses suffered in the more recent past appear to constitute an
irreversible and aggravating trend featured by indications that could well
portend a final collapse.
Despite the weakening of
its grip on the eastern lowlands that resulted from the calamitous
breakaway of the Karuna group, the LTTE leadership persisted with
unswerving commitment to its goal of establishing a sovereign Tamil
nation-state – ‘Eelam’ – encompassing the entire ‘northeast’
of Sri Lanka, the pledges of the ceasefire agreement of February 2000
notwithstanding. As in earlier times, its efforts were directed mainly at
enhancement of military strength, expanding the territory under its
control in the Northern and Eastern provinces and eliminating its rivals
in that part of the country, mobilising international support for its
cause, and destabilising the Government of Sri Lanka through carefully
regulated intimidation and terror. That instigating a Sinhalese backlash
of violence against the Tamils living outside the northeast – a
re-enactment of 1983 – also remained a prime objective was underscored
by the assassination of Sri Lanka’s charismatic Foreign Minister,
Lakshman Kadirgamar, a provocative outrage committed in the final days of
Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidential tenure.
Colombo-based politics
of the country during this period remained in a state of flux, featured by
both frequent changes of the power configuration as well as intense
electoral rivalry. Given the fact that the release of the foreign aid
pledged by the donors remained conditional on progress being made towards
a negotiated settlement of the conflict, Government policy had to
accommodate two mutually conflicting needs – that of strengthening
security and defence in the face of the mounting Tiger threat, on the one
hand, and persistence with credible peace overtures to the LTTE, on the
other. The latter encountered the almost insurmountable problem of fierce
inter-party dissension on what could be offered to the Tigers without
endangering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
On the eve of the
presidential election of November 2005 Prabhakaran enforced a boycott of
the polls in the north and parts of the eastern lowlands where Ranil
Wickremasinghe, former Prime Minister and a frontrunner of the
presidential stakes, would have attracted substantially more support than
his rival Mahinda Rajapakse. This decision appears, in retrospect, to have
been a monumental blunder that marks the onset of a drastic change in the
fortunes of Prabhakaran’s Eelam campaign. The boycott decision was
evidently based upon the premise that Wickremasinghe, hailed
internationally as the ‘peace candidate’, if elected, would, with his
commitment to power-sharing under a federal system of Government, place in
serious jeopardy the case for a secessionist campaign. Prabhakaran’s
expectation was that Rajapakse, if successful in his presidential bid,
backed as he was by electoral allies vehemently opposed to a political
compromise involving devolution of power to the northeast, would actually
attempt to implement his campaign pledges to jettison the ceasefire
agreement, to evict the "White Tigers" (Norwegians) from their
role as facilitators of peace negotiations, and to discard the notion of
LTTE being the sole representative of the Tamils. Such a hawkish approach,
the LTTE leadership believed, would pave the way for a resumption of
military confrontations in earnest, backed by vastly enhanced
international sympathy and support for the rebels’ cause.
Having contributed to
Rajapakse’s victory at the election, the LTTE leaders began to test the
resolve of the new President. Thus, while articulating with greater
vehemence than ever before their earlier demands for Government
intervention in disarming the Karuna group, and for constitutional power
over the northeast pending a final resolution of the conflict, they
launched a series of guerrilla attacks and acts of terrorism which, in
April 2006, reached the heart of Colombo’s defence establishment in the
near-successful attempt to assassinate the Commander of the Sri Lanka
Army, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka.
The sharply escalating
level of violence did not evoke a retaliatory response from the
Government, at least for some time. Rajapakse persisted with his pursuit
of peace, risking, in the process, the support of some of his
parliamentary allies. He established an ‘All-Party Representative
Committee’ tasked with formulating constitutional reforms based on the
axiom of devolution. He backed the Norwegian efforts at facilitating fresh
peace negotiations, expressing a solemn hope that the brief meeting
between delegates of the Government and the LTTE staged at Geneva in
February 2006 would mark the resumption of a continuing dialogue with the
Tiger leadership. Rajapakse was also reported to have made a ‘secret’ attempt
to establish direct contact with the LTTE high-command, knowing fully well
that the attempt would not be kept concealed from Sri Lanka’s friends
abroad. The intensifying LTTE violence, however, could not be ignored
indefinitely. From the commencement of Rajapakse’s presidency up to the
bomb attack on the Army Commander (approximately 150 days), 150 armed
services personnel, in addition to about 150 civilians, had been killed by
the LTTE. The animosity between the LTTE and the security forces had
reached such fever pitch, and the nationalists’ pressure for some
retaliation had become so intense that the President was eventually
compelled to initiate a series of air strikes on identified LTTE bases.
Nevertheless, as the President had surmised, the continuing belligerence
of the LTTE, on the one hand, and the show of restraint by the Government,
on the other, did resonate in the policy stances, vis-à-vis Sri
Lanka, of several western Governments, both in a substantially enhanced
flow of aid as well as in the imposition of sanctions on the LTTE in
member-states of the EU and in Canada in May-June 2006.
The repercussions of
Prabhakaran’s capricious gamble at the presidential polls soon instilled
into his strategy a sense of desperation. This found expression in a
series of ‘Sea Tiger’ attacks (including an act of piracy) that evoked
strictures from several quarters including the Secretary General of the UN
and the Head of the Scandinavian ‘Ceasefire Monitoring Mission’
stationed in Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran retaliated by demanding the removal of
all non-Norwegian members of the Monitoring Mission from the northeast.
The tempo of violence was increased further with a spate of attacks on
military and civilian targets in all parts of the country. Then came the
major military showdown in the eastern lowlands that began on July 20,
2006, in the form of a ‘riparian’ confrontation in the irrigation
channel system of Mavil Aru (south of Trincomalee) which compelled the
Government to retaliate in earnest, with a nod of approval from the US.
Thereafter, following a series of bloody battles that lasted up until
mid-2007 in the course of which the LTTE incurred heavy losses, the rebels
were finally evicted from the entire Eastern Province.
Throughout this period
of intense military activity in the ‘East’, confrontations between the
security forces and the LTTE elsewhere in the country took various forms.
The Forward Defence Lines (FDL) of the Government-controlled areas in the
Jaffna peninsula and in the hinterland of Mannar continued to be venues of
low intensity clashes, with occasional flare-ups of short duration. In
localities adjacent to the FDL in Vavuniya District, Army killings of
suspected insurgents and LTTE claymore-mine attacks and ambushes of Army
patrols occurred in routine fashion. The severe ‘maritime’ losses
suffered by the LTTE during these months included the sinking of eleven of
its vessels off the east coast. More significant, as an ingredient of the
LTTE military debacle than any other, was the destruction caused by the
constant barrage of aerial bombardments in one of which (November 3, 2007)
Thamilchelvan, Head of the LTTE’s political wing, perished, and in
another (November 27, 2007), Prabhakaran suffered injury.
These military defeats
constitute only one (albeit the key) component of the current LTTE crisis.
The mutually interacting ‘external’ misfortunes of the Tigers in the
recent past include the death in December 2006 of Anton Balasingham, who
had served for well over two decades as, by far, the most effective
international spokesman and propagandist for the secessionist campaign.
The impact of the loss of its carefully nurtured image of invincibility
has been even more profound, especially on the support from the expatriate
Sri Lankan Tamil communities whose responses to fluctuating fortunes of
the LTTE have never been devoid of elements typical of ‘cheer-squad’
reactions. Recent reports also indicate that the increasingly stringent
enforcement of anti-terrorism regulations in some of the western countries
has curtailed both diaspora funding as well as other operations of LTTE
agents and ‘front’ outfits abroad. The crescendo of their desperate
campaign for UN ‘humanitarian intervention’ against the alleged
proliferation of human rights violations in Sri Lanka has achieved a
measure of success in generating external pressures against the
country’s war effort, but has had no mitigating effect on the pariah
status of the Tigers.
Foremost among the
‘internal’ causes for the present LTTE crisis is the prevailing trend
towards factional disintegration of its leadership which, as the related
evidence suggests, could well represent the emergence at the surface of
subterranean rivalries that had been in existence all along. It may be
recalled that the departure of Karuna itself caused a mini-purge in the
Tiger leadership. Thereafter, when Thamilchelvan was killed in November
2007, certain critics (among them, S.R. Balasubramaniam, Congress Party
leader in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu), cast doubt on the
‘official’ explanation of the death, and pointed to the possibility of
Thamilchelvan having been killed by Prabhakaran in the same way he had
liquidated other potential rivals in the past. In addition, throughout the
recent years, there has been the barely concealed animosity between two of
the highest ranking Tiger leaders – ‘Pottu Amman’ (alias
Shanmuganathan Sivasankaran, the feared Head of the Tiger intelligence
network whose spectacular ‘hits’ include the masterminding of the
Rajiv Gandhi assassination) and ‘Soosai’(alias, Thillaiyampalan
Sivanesan), the charismatic ‘Sea Tiger’ ‘admiral’. According to an
analysis of this rivalry by the journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj, when Soosai
[who had been accused by Pottu Amman of connivance with the renegade
Karuna and the Indian external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW)] suffered serious injury in 2004 while engaged in a speed-boat
manoeuvre (though the injury was officially attributed to an accident) the
widespread and lingering belief within the LTTE that it was the
consequence of an attempt by Pottu to murder Soosai had given rise to
clashes among its rank and file, which took a long time to subside.
Factional rivalries of this type in the Vanni and their repercussions
outside the country are likely to intensify if, indeed, the reported
weakening of Prabhakaran’s grip over the LTTE contains substance.
Yet another
‘internal’ dimension of the crisis is seen in the recent resurgence of
several anti-LTTE political organisations among the Tamil community of Sri
Lanka, most of which were reconciled to a shadowy existence in the heyday
of the Tigers in the past. Tamil critics of the LTTE have become bolder in
expressing their views than ever before. Some among them repeatedly
announced that the ‘Eelam’ campaign is doomed. A distinction between
the LTTE interests and those of the Tamils of Sri Lanka is being drawn
with clarity and vehemence. There is also a publicly expressed suspicion
that the recent spate of murders of several pro-LTTE activists operating
outside the northeast represents the work of such organisations, the
members of which rank among the innumerable victims of LTTE terror.
As a barrier to progress
towards statutory recognition of the entire northeast as a ethnically
distinctive entity (which, of course, constitutes the conceptual basis of
the secessionist campaign), the Supreme Court verdict announced on October
16, 2006, according to which the then existing amalgamation of the
Northern and Eastern provinces to constitute a single unit of Provincial
Government (a sequel to the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987) had all along
(since the expiry of 12 months after the related constitutional amendment)
been constitutionally ultra vires, is even more insurmountable than
the military eviction of the LTTE from the east.
The cumulative impact of
these complex military and political reverses on the LTTE has been
devastating, producing the most acute crisis of the group’s existence.
Sustained Government operations in the North now have the capacity to
inflict progressive damage on the rebel infrastructure and support base,
increasingly undermining any residual potential for recovery and
consolidation.
[Source:
South Asian Intelligence Review]
News
Briefs
135
LTTE militants and 28 soldiers killed during the week: At
least 169 persons, including 135 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
militants and 28 soldiers, were killed in separate incidents between March
22 and 29, 2008. Among the major incidents, 11 sailors were killed when a
locally–built fast attack craft of the Sri Lanka Navy was caught in a
LTTE-triggered sea mine explosion in the Nayaru Sea on March 22. Ten LTTE
militants were killed by the troops during clashes in the Kallikulam area
of Vavuniya District on March 23. Nine militants were killed and several
others injured during an encounter with troops in the north of Janakapura
in Vavuniya District on March 27. On March 28, nine militants were killed
during two separate clashes in the Kaduruvitankulam and Periyathampane
areas of the Vavuniya District. Further, 10 more militants were killed as
the troops advanced over an area of about 700 metres in the Ilantaivan
region of Mannar District on March 29. Among the civilian casualties, the
Deputy Chairman of the Moneragala local council, A. Muththulingam, was
shot dead by unidentified gunmen in the evening of March 29. Sri
Lanka Army; Colombo
Page, March 24-31, 2008.
LTTE
has links with global terrorist groups, says Prime Minister Ratnasiri
Wickremanayake: Prime Minister
Ratnasiri Wickremanayake stated that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) maintains links with international terrorist groups such as the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and certain affiliates of al Qaeda.
"According to some experts on terrorism, they maintain contacts with
other terror groups such as PKK, Taliban, Islamic groups in the
Philippines and even some affiliates of Al Qaeda," he said. He also
said that certain reports mentioned that Tamil youths received training in
Palestinian camps in Syria and Lebanon. "The Black Tigers are
responsible for suicide operations and have perfected suicide bombings and
assassinations. It is generally believed that they learnt it from some
Palestinian groups," Wickremanayake told a gathering in Jerusalem in
Israel. Times of India,
March 25, 2008.
165
LTTE militants killed in separate incidents during the week:
At
least 165 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants
and 16 soldiers were killed in separate incidents between
March 16 and 23, 2008. Among the major incidents, 12 LTTE
militants were killed by the troops during separate
encounters in the Pandivirichchen, Villattikulam, Kallikulam,
Kappankulam and Nedunkandal areas of Vavuniya district and
Periyakulam area of Mannar district on March 16. Eight
militants were killed and two of their bunkers destroyed in
an ambush carried out by the Army Special Infantry at
Kottakkarankulam, West of Omanthai, in the Vavuniya district
on March 19-evening. Similarly, 25 LTTE cadres and four
soldiers were killed as the troops successfully responding
to heavy resistance by the militants moved forward and
captured an area of about one square kilometer in the
Periyakulam and Ilantaivan regions, north of Uyilankulam in
the Mannar district on March 22. 13 more LTTE militants were
killed when the troops confronted a group of outfit’s
militants in the areas southwest of Madhu and Kallikulam in
the Vavuniya district on the same day. Seven LTTE militants
were killed and 10 others injured by the troops during
clashes between the two sides in the Kiriibbanwewa area of
Vavuniya district. Sri
Lanka Army, March 17-23, 2008.
LTTE
ready for conditional talks: The Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have expressed readiness to hold talks
with the Government if it halted the military operations
against them, but warned that the offer should not be seen
as "any desperation" on their part to stop the
war. "The LTTE is prepared to commence negotiations
with the Sri Lankan Government if the Government security
forces are ordered to halt their military operations. It was
the Government which started the war," the LTTE
political head P. Nadesan told a group of Parliamentarians
from the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance in Wanni recently.
"The offer of the LTTE for a ceasefire and talks should
not be construed as any desperation on our (LTTE’s) part
to stop the war. The ball is in the Sri Lankan Government's
court. It was they who started the armed attack,"
Nadesan was quoted as saying, by Suresh Premachandran, a TNA
parliamentarian from Jaffna District, who was present at the
meeting. Times
of India, March 16, 2008.
TNA
parliamentarian killed in explosion in Kilinochchi district:
The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) Member of Parliament
(MP) K. Siwaneshan, representing the Jaffna District was
killed in an explosion in the Kanagarayankulam area of
Kilinochchi District on March 6, 2008. The pro- Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Website Tamil Net, however,
alleged that K. Siwaneshan was killed in a claymore mine
attack carried out by the Sri Lanka Army’s Deep
Penetration Unit on A-9 road, 30-minutes after he crossed
into Vanni through Oamanthai / Puliyangkulam entry point on
March 6. His driver was also killed in the attack. The
military, however, said no operations were being carried out
there at that time. Three of the TNA's 22 MPs have been
killed since fighting between the Government and the LTTE
resumed in 2005. Joseph Pararajasingham, a representative
for the eastern Batticaloa District was killed while
attending a Christmas mass in 2005. His colleague, Nadarajah
Raviraj, was killed in the capital Colombo in November 2006.
The
Hindu, March 7, 2008.
LTTE
chief Prabhakaran may commit suicide, say Sri Lankan
leaders: Predicting the collapse of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), some leaders in Sri Lanka have
said the LTTE chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran, will have no
choice other than to "commit suicide" when the Sri
Lankan security forces zero in on him. "He
(Prabhakaran) will not be alive till the military arrests
him. Simply, he will commit suicide. This is the nature of
people like him," Social Services and Social Welfare
Minister Douglas Devananda said. The Marxist JVP party
leader Somawansa Amarasinghe also made similar predictions
about the fate of the LTTE chief. "LTTE leader
Prabhakaran will soon have to commit suicide by swallowing
the cyanide capsule tied around his neck while the LTTE will
come to an end without a leader," Amarasinghe told
reporters. Meanwhile, the online newspaper Asian Tribune
quoted a senior official as saying that Prabhakaran, who was
suffering from diabetes, had lost his commanding position.
The official, quoting intelligence sources, said the outfit
was in "shambles" and two senior rival leaders had
taken over the day to day activities of the LTTE, it said. Times
of India, March 2, 2008.
[Source:
South Asian Intelligence Review]

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