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(Afghanistan and
Myanmar in the
map are not members of SAARC)
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Beyond
the Lal Masjid Showdown
A
Progression of Crises
Ajai
Sahni
Editor, SAIR;
Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
The
Lal Masjid – Jamia Hafsa crisis, which has been six slow
months in the making, finally came to a boil on June 3, 2007,
when militant students tried to grab a property near the mosque
and were confronted by the Security Forces. An armed engagement
followed, and subsequent Army operations to blow away the
boundary walls of the Complex have resulted in intermittent
exchanges of fire. Official sources maintain a total of 20
killed – including a Lieutenant Colonel of the Special
Services Group on Sunday, June 8 – though Abdul Rashid
‘Ghazi’, the leader of the ‘resistance’ inside the
Mosque, claims that over 335 of his students (including 310
women) have been killed inside the Complex by Army fire.
In
what appear to be disturbing connected developments, three
Chinese men were shot dead and a fourth was critically wounded
on June 8, in Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP),
where the victims had set up a small unit to manufacture
three-wheel auto rickshaws. Significantly, there had been
widespread speculation that the military action against the Lal
Masjid – Jamia Hafsa Complex had been taken under Chinese
(and, of course, American) pressure, after six Chinese women and
one man, among nine persons, were abducted by militant students
of the Seminary on June 23, 2007, on allegations of running a
brothel under the guise of a massage centre. All the abductees
were subsequently released, but China had, in fact, on June 27,
officially asked Pakistan to step up its protection of Chinese
workers in the country.
In
another related development, President Pervez Musharraf’s
plane was shot at on June 6, 2007, when it was taking off from
the military airfield at Chaklala in Rawalpindi. A machine gun
and two artillery weapons were subsequently recovered from the
roof of a house nearby, though officials initially denied there
had been an assassination attempt. The firing on the plane, in
any event, had been wide off target.
A
number of violent incidents and protests have also occurred
across the country after the initiation of the Lal Masjid
operation by the Army, and there are indications that these
could escalate. The Karkoram Highway was blockaded at various
places in the Mansehra and Abottabad Districts of the NWFP; in
Quetta, activists of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI, Fazlur
Rehman faction) held demonstrations protesting the ‘attack’
on Lal Masjid; at Khairpur in the Punjab, Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and JUI activists forced a shut-down on the
town; in Lahore, students of the Jamia Asharfia held
demonstration on the main Ferozpur Road; and in Okara, students
of the Jamia Masjid forced shopkeepers to down shutters in
protest. There have also been several attacks against security
forces. On June 4, a suicide attack on a military convoy near
Mir Ali in North Waziristan killed at least 11 persons,
including six soldiers. On the same day, six persons, including
two policemen, were also killed in three separate attacks by
religious extremists in Swat District. Militant groups in Swat
had earlier warned of ‘serious repercussions’ in case the
Government took action against the Lal Masjid – Jamia Hafsa
complex. On June 9, tens of thousands of tribesmen, including
hundreds of masked militants wielding assault rifles, led by
Maulana Faqir Mohammad, a cleric on Islamabad’s wanted list,
demonstrated in Bajaur in FATA,
raising violent slogans and calling for "Death to
Musharraf".
Official
sources have now claimed that eight "high value
terrorists" were "holed up" inside the Lal Masjid,
while one had already been killed there. These terrorists,
Religious Affairs Minister Ejazul Haq asserted, without
disclosing their identities, were "far more dangerous and
harmful than Al
Qaeda and Taliban
operatives." Haq asserted that the militants were from the
Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami, had taken control of the complex, and
were "holding children and Ghazi hostage".
Significantly, President Musharraf had claimed, on June 29, that
militants from the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
and al Qaeda were hiding in the Lal Masjid Complex.
Within
the broad context of Pakistan’s troubled politics, current
levels of violence in the wake of the Lal Masjid – Jamia Hafsa
operation are far from exceptional. Indeed, in all aspects, the
militant challenge appears unequal; even contemptible. Despite
boasts of ‘hundreds of suicide bombers’, the ‘Lal Masjid
brigade’ has responded rather tamely, with not a single
suicide attack, and over 1,221 surrenders. The big-talking head
of the Masjid, Abdul Aziz, who claimed to derive his mandate
from the Prophet Muhammad appearing in his dreams and who had
repeatedly exhorted his followers to embrace shahadat (martyrdom),
was caught in humiliating circumstances, trying to slink out of
the military cordon in a woman’s burqa (full body
veil). Indeed, at a purely military level, overcoming the
resistance in the Seminary Complex would be a pushover for the
Army, were it not for concerns about the loss of innocent lives.
The essentially military challenge at Lal Masjid is
insignificant, as the radical Islamist former Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI)
chief, Hamid Gul, notes, Aziz and Ghazi "are traditional
clerics and not jihadis." In any event, after the
death of a senior officer the Army cannot be expected to be in a
particularly forgiving mood. Moreover, despite the slow build-up
of the crisis, and its eventual provocation by the militant Lal
Masjid students themselves, it is abundantly clear that Ghazi
had not prepared his followers for a direct and protracted
confrontation with the Army. While a few small arms and possibly
some explosives are clearly in the possession of the militants
– effective weapons to breach the siege or to deliver
explosive loads at spatially distanced targets are evidently
lacking.
But
it is not here that the principal danger lies. With crisis
following crisis in thick succession, everything – even a
so-called ‘assassination attempt’ on Musharraf which was, at
best, ludicrous, with no significant danger to the President at
any time – weakens him and destabilizes his regime. The
unstable equilibria that the Pakistani state had established
with various non-democratic power-players, including tribal
chieftans, radical Islamists, Islamist terrorists and the
Army’s political proxies, are rapidly crumbling in an
accelerating progression of emergencies, and the Islamists are
now seeking to violently renegotiate the distribution of
national political power. In all possible outcomes other than
the most violent and enveloping oppression – and even this, at
best, would be a temporary evasion – Musharraf will be the
inevitable loser. Structurally, Pakistan is now poised for a
radical reconfiguration of power equations and any measures to
forcibly prevent this from happening can only be transient and
potentially counterproductive.
These
pressures converge with the wide spectrum of other political
forces – including the ‘secular’ democratic formations –
that are seeking greater democracy and an end to Musharraf’s
role as Army Chief after the November 2007 Presidential
elections. Simultaneously, the judiciary is engaged in a major
bid for the reassertion of its authority and independence,
engineered through the confrontation over the dismissal of Chief
Justice Iftikhar Choudhry – a confrontation that, many
believe, puts Musharraf bid to retain his uniform directly at
risk.
For
Musharraf and the Army, however, no measure of greater
devolution is acceptable, not only in view of the Army’s
perceived ‘obligations’ of national security and
reconstruction, but because of the enormous accumulation of what
Ayesha Siddiqa has described as "illegal military
capital", and the Army’s tremendous financial interests
in every aspect of national administration and commerce. Siddiqa,
in her book Military Inc., notes that, "The
military’s power allows it to define its economic interests
and exploit public and private sector resources, a behaviour
that increases the organisation’s appetite for power."
Musharraf will accept no dilution of power unless it is forced
on him – and the Army’s continued pre-eminence within the
country makes such a coercive outcome unlikely in the
foreseeable future.
There
is, of course, an influential stream of opinion in Pakistan that
suggests that the Lal Masjid crisis, like other crises before,
has simply been orchestrated by the regime in order to conjure
its dramatic and proximate ‘resolution’ – no doubt with
the loss of some expendable lives – that would help cement
Musharraf’s crumbling image as a bastion against Islamist
extremism and the Talibanisation of national politics. There is
some inconclusive evidence that the crisis may have been
collusively orchestrated by elements within the establishment
and the intelligence services, and the fact that the crisis was
permitted to fester and, indeed, to cyclically escalate, from
the first incidents – the takeover of a public library by
women students of the Jamia Hafsa – in January 2007, gives
some credence to such an assessment. As with virtually every
aspect of politics in Pakistan, there are contradictory elements
in play, underlining the complex relationships between the jihadi
elements within the country and the military leadership.
As
with the strategy of ‘management’ of radicalism in the NWFP
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), however,
this approach has inherent risks and limitations. While the Army
remains committed to a nationalist perspective – albeit
increasingly tainted with elements of the Islamist extremist and
jihadi ideology – at least some of the jihadi groups
go beyond the boundaries of the sarkari (officially
sanctioned) ideology to embrace a puritan pan-Islamist dogma
that rejects the primacy of nationalist or State interests. It
has, till now, been possible to direct much of the fury of this
radicalised Islamist terrorist element outwards – towards
Afghanistan and India – but there is evidence of an increasing
proportion of this rage turning inwards.
Abdul
Rashid Ghazi has sought to protract the standoff at the Lal
Masjid, calling for the suspension of the military operation
pending a judicial determination of any alleged wrongdoing by
him. At the time of writing, however, reports suggested that a
high-level meeting convened by Musharraf was hammering out the
details of a final military strategy to end the confrontation. A
military ‘victory’ may give Musharraf some immediate relief,
partially restoring his sagging image in the international media
and community, and aiding his projection as Pakistan’s last
bulwark against extremism and terrorism. But slow processes of
attrition are working against Musharraf and there has been a
steady loss of both domestic and international legitimacy for
his regime. The build-up in the Lal Masjid complex contributed
to this loss of legitimacy for over six months; a violent
resolution of the crisis will do nothing to restore such
legitimacy. It is only through the augmenting use of force and
the ambivalent and precarious manipulation of jihadi sentiments
that the Musharraf regime will continue to retain its grip over
power in Pakistan.
[Source:
South Asian Intelligence Review]
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News
Briefs
Eight
police personnel among 15 persons killed in Islamabad suicide bombing: At
least 15 people, including eight police personnel, were killed and 53
others wounded, when a suicide bomber struck a group of police personnel
in a restaurant following a clash between the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque)
activists and the police after Friday prayers in Islamabad on July 27,
2007. The bomber blew himself up at the Muzaffargarh Nihari House and the
Pakwan Centre, some 500 yards away from the Lal Masjid in a busy business
centre in a thickly populated area of the capital at about 5.20 pm.
"It was a suicide bombing. We have found the remains of the attacker
and we are carrying out DNA testing," said interior ministry
spokesperson Brig (retd) Javed Cheema. Jang,
July 28, 2007.
Only
13,000 Madrassas registered: The
Ministry of Religious Affairs has so far registered only 13,000 Madrassas
(seminaries), while their actual number is estimated to be over
200,000 across the country, according to Dawn. The interior ministry has
reportedly expressed concern over the issue as the ministry of religious
affairs does not have a proper mechanism to determine the exact number of
seminaries operating unlawfully. The exact number of students studying in
the country’s seminaries is not yet known, as the ministry of religious
affairs has so far registered only those seminaries that house 30-40
students. Officials in the ministry of religious affairs said there has
been a sharp growth in institutions associated with the Deobandi school of
thought and the interior ministry was quite concerned about this and was
proposing to hand over the job to the Interior Secretary, Syed Kamal Shah.
The North West Frontier Province had reportedly witnessed the largest
number of unregistered religious institutions. Dawn,
July 26, 2007.
Taliban
commander Abdullah Mehsud blows himself up in Balochistan: Taliban
commander Abdullah Mehsud blew himself up to avoid arrest after he was
surrounded by security forces in a house at Zhob in Balochistan on July
24, 2007. Anti-terrorist Force (ATF) commandoes raided the house of Sheikh
Ayub Mandokhel, a district leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Maulana Fazlur
Rehman faction), before morning prayers after learning that Mehsud was
inside. "The ATF asked Abdullah Mehsud to surrender and take off his
shirt when they had almost overpowered him. However, he refused to
surrender and blew himself up with explosives," said an unnamed
source in the provincial capital Quetta. The ATF also arrested Ayub’s
younger brother, Sheikh Azam, and his son, Sheikh Sheryar. The whereabouts
of Sheikh Ayub were unknown. Interior Ministry spokesperson Javed Iqbal
Cheema confirmed the killing and said in Islamabad that Mehsud was wanted
for the abduction of two Chinese engineers in 2004 and for "many
terror attacks." Daily
Times, July 25, 2007.
35
militants killed in clashes in North Waziristan: Heavy fighting killed
at least 35 militants and two soldiers in North Waziristan, the military
said on July 23, 2007. Major General Waheed Arshad, chief of the
Inter-Services Public Relations, informed that at least 30 militants died
in a series of clashes since late July 22, and five more were killed in a
battle that continued on July 23-evening. Two soldiers were killed and 12
others injured in the violence over the past 24 hours. Meanwhile,
pro-Taliban groups warned Pakistani soldiers to quit fighting or face the
"gift of death" through new suicide attacks. In pamphlets,
distributed in Miranshah town on July 23, entitled "Till Islam Lives
in Islamabad" a group calling itself the Mujahideen-i-Islam
threatened that suicide bombs would again bring soldiers the "gift of
death". They warned that suicide attackers "love death more than
you love your 5,000-rupee salary, nude pictures of Indian actresses and
liquor… We know that you have become America’s slave and are serving
infidel Musharraf and have become a traitor to your religion for food,
clothes and shelter." Dawn,
July 24, 2007.
Osama
Bin Laden in Pakistan, says US National Intelligence Director: Al
Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden is alive and sheltering in the lawless parts
of Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan, US National Intelligence
Director Mike McConnell said on July 22, 2007. McConnell blamed President
Pervez Musharraf’s Government for allowing al Qaeda to regroup via a
peace deal with the militants in North Waziristan in September 2006. Asked
about bin Laden, he told NBC Television, "My personal view is that
he’s alive. I believe he is in the tribal region of Pakistan."
McConnell added that if Musharraf were forced from power by the Islamist
violence and pro-democracy unrest sweeping Pakistan that could have a
"severe impact" on the US struggle against terrorism. Daily
Times, July 23, 2007.
Chief
Justice of Pakistan restored unanimously: A
13-member bench of the Supreme Court (SC) on July 20, 2007, reinstated the
Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, ruling that his
suspension by President Pervez Musharraf was "illegal". By a
10-3 vote, the judges also quashed a case of alleged misconduct against
Justice Chaudhry, which the President had referred to the Supreme Judicial
Council (SJC). Following the SC’s verdict, Chaudhry resumed charge of
his office at 4:20pm. He had been appointed as the CJP on June 30, 2005,
and is due to retire on December 12, 2013. The SC gave its short order on
a petition filed by the CJP challenging the presidential reference against
him, after hearing the case for 43 days. The full court unanimously
declared the two restraint orders and one compulsory leave order against
the CJP illegal, and also annulled the notifications of the appointment of
Justice Javed Iqbal and Justice Rana Bhagwandas as acting chief justice of
Pakistan passed on March 9 and 23 respectively. Jang,
July 21, 2007.
22
civilians and seven police personnel killed in suicide attack in
Balochistan: 22 civilians and seven
police officers were killed and around 50 people wounded in a suicide car
bomb attack at the Gadani Bus Stop in the industrial town of Hub in
Balochistan on July 19-morning. Inspector General of Police Tariq Masood
Khosa, said, "It was a suicide attack that was targeted at Chinese
engineers working in Balochistan." Daily
Times, July 20, 2007.
Suicide
attacks kills 24 persons in NWFP: 15 persons were killed and several
people sustained injuries when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a
mosque in the Kohat Cantonment area of North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
on July 19, 2007. Most of the victims were reportedly Army personnel.
Separately, five civilians and two policemen were killed and 35 others
injured when a suicide bomber set off his explosives-packed car at the
Hangu Police Training College. Dawn,
July 20, 2007.
16
persons killed in suicide attack in Islamabad: A
suicide bomber struck outside the venue of a lawyers rally in Islamabad on
July 17, 2007, killing 16 people and wounding at least 63. Interior
Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao said "It was apparently a suicide
bombing." The blast occurred at about 8:27 pm outside the main
entrance of the corridor leading to the venue of the event in F-8 Markaz,
shortly before the reinstated Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was
to pass through the site to give a speech to lawyers of the Islamabad
District Bar Association. Daily
Times, July 18, 2007.
47
people killed in two suicide attacks in NWFP:
At least 47 people were killed and over a hundred injured in suicide
bombings targeting security forces (SFs) in the Swat and Dera Ismail Khan
Districts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) on July 15, 2007, in
apparent revenge attacks by militants for the Lal Masjid operation. In the
first attack, at least 13 SF personnel and six civilians, including three
children, were killed and more than 50 people sustained injuries at Matta
in the Swat district when two suicide bombers rammed two cars packed with
explosives into an army convoy early in the morning. And at approximately
4:15pm (PST), a suicide bomber blew himself up at the Dera Ismail Khan
Police Lines as candidates took Police entrance exams. Police official
Safiullah disclosed that 26 people were killed, including 12 police
personnel and the suicide bomber, and 61 others were wounded. Interior
Minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao said the two attacks could be a militant
response to the Lal Masjid assault. Jang;
Daily Times,
July 16, 2007.
Militants
unilaterally scrap 10-month old peace accord in North Waziristan: Tribal
militants in North Waziristan unilaterally scrapped their 10-month-old
peace accord with the Government on July 15, 2007, on the expiry of a
four-day deadline and threatened to launch attacks against the security
forces in the area. Abdullah Farhad, a spokesman for the militants, said
their Shura (council), under the leadership of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, had
decided to end the peace accord and ordered their fighters to start
guerrilla attacks against the troops deployed in North Waziristan. He said
the Taliban fighters were advised not to launch attacks in populated areas
so that civilians were saved from the consequences. The militants had
threatened to end the accord by July 15 if the Pakistan Army troops
redeployed at several roadside checkpoints in North Waziristan were not
withdrawn. They termed it a violation of the peace accord signed on
September 5, 2006. Jang,
July 16, 2007.
24
soldiers killed in suicide attack in North Waziristan: A
suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car into a military convoy in
the Daz Nerai area of North Waziristan on July 14, 2007, killing at least
24 soldiers and injuring 27 others. Pakistan's defence spokesperson, Major
General Waheed Arshad disclosed that a car filled with explosives hit a
military convoy, which was moving from Ramzak to Bannu in the North West
Frontier Province. The Hindu,
July 15, 2007.
102
people died in Lal Masjid operation, says Interior Minister: Federal
Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao disclosed on July 13, 2007, that 102
persons lost their lives in the operation at Lal Masjid, including 91
civilians and 11 soldiers. He also said that four to five corpses have
been identified as that of suspected foreign militants. Addressing a Press
Conference in Islamabad, he said 248 people sustained injuries in the
operation. However, Interior Secretary Syed Kamal Shah told reporters
after the Minister’s Press Conference that "In the final assault,
some 75 people were killed in the complex and I think 50 to 60 were
militants and the rest were women and children." Earlier on July 10,
Abdul Rashid Ghazi, deputy chief cleric of the Lal Masjid, was among
dozens killed as Pakistan Army commandos stormed the mosque compound after
a weeklong standoff with militant students. More than 50 militants and
nine soldiers were killed in the 15-hour operation, which commenced
shortly before dawn on July 10, said Major General Arshad Waheed, Director
General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Ghazi had claimed
to a television channel on July 8 that 335 people had already been killed
within the Complex. The final assault by Government Forces was reportedly
approved after talks between a delegation of ministers and clerics led by
Pakistan Muslim League President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain failed to
negotiate a surrender with Ghazi. Dawn;
Daily Times,
July 11-14, 2007.
Al
Qaeda urges revenge over Lal Masjid issue: Al
Qaeda’s second-in command, Ayman al Zawahri, in an internet video posted
on July 11, 2007, called for revenge over the Pakistani military’s
operation that killed more than 70 militants inside the Islamabad-based
Lal Masjid. "This crime can only be washed by repentance or
blood," Zawahri said in the video posted on web sites used by
Islamists. "If you do not retaliate ... (President General Pervez)
Musharraf will not spare any of you," he said, addressing Pakistani
Muslims and their clerical leaders. Daily
Times, July 12, 2007.
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil in protective custody in Islamabad: The
Government on July 10, 2007, took Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, chief of
the banned Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), into protective custody after the
death of Abdur Rashid Ghazi. "Fazlur Rehman Khalil has been taken
into protective custody at his residence-cum-Madrassa in Islamabad in view
of the security situation," sources told Daily Times. Khalil was a
close aide of Ghazi and had reportedly played a crucial role in the failed
talks between the Government and Lal Masjid administration on the night of
July 10. Sources added that Khalil was taken into protective custody to
avoid a backlash following Ghazi’s death. They also said Farooq
Kashmiri, another militant commander, who was called in from Azad Jammu
and Kashmir (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) two days ago, was already in the
government’s custody. Daily
Times, July 11, 2007.
Standoff
between militants and troops at Lal Masjid continues: While
the standoff between Lal Masjid militants and security forces in Islamabad
entered the seventh day, a Special Services Group Commander, Lt-Col Haroon
Islam, was killed by the militants on July 8, 2007. Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz reportedly presided over a high-level security meeting at which he
reiterated the Government’s position that the militants must release all
hostages, lay down their weapons and submit before the law. Earlier, at
least 19 people were killed and around 150 injured in a daylong shootout
between the seminary students and security force personnel near the mosque
on July 3. The administration confirmed that a journalist, one soldier of
the para-military Rangers, a businessman, seminary students and bystanders
were among the dead. The shootout commenced at around 11am after students
of the Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia, madrassas (seminaries) affiliated
to the Lal Masjid, marched towards the nearby Environment Ministry
building and a security picket outside it. Dawn;
Daily Times;
Jang,
July 4-9, 2007.
President
Pervez Musharraf escapes assassination attempt in Rawalpindi:
President Pervez Musharraf escaped an assassination attempt on July
6-morning when around 36 rounds fired at his aircraft from a submachine
gun in Rawalpindi missed their target. Police said that General
Musharraf’s aircraft took off from the Chaklala airbase for flood-hit
areas of Balochistan and Sindh at around 10:15 am (PST) and came under
fire soon thereafter. The rounds were fired by a sub machinegun 10.62
installed on the roof of a two-storey house, Fazal Manzil, in Asghar Mall
close to the Islamabad Airport and the Chaklala Airbase. Security force
personnel subsequently seized a submachine gun, two anti-aircraft guns
with tripods and two satellite antennas and arrested the house owner,
Muhammad Sharif. Neighbours said that three bearded men, a woman and two
children used to live in the house, but none of them were present when the
troops reached there. The Inter-Services Public Relations Director
General, Major General Waheed Arshad, while denying the attack said,
"The President was not in the aircraft which was targeted. I have no
details about the incident as investigations are underway." Daily
Times, July 7, 2007.
11
people killed in suicide attack in North Waziristan:
11 people, including six security force (SF) personnel, died in a suicide
attack on a caravan of SFs in North Waziristan on July 4, 2007. The
caravan was going to Bannu in the North West Frontier Province from
Miranshah, headquarters of North Waziristan when a suicide attacker rammed
his explosive-laden car with the caravan near Mir Ali. Four SF personnel
and a child passer-by died on the spot while two soldiers and three
passers-by succumbed to injuries at a hospital. The suicide attacker also
was killed. Jang,
July 5, 2007.
Taliban
on the march in NWFP, says Interior Ministry: A special report, which
the New York Times claims to have been shown, warned President Pervez
Musharraf that Islamic militants and Taliban fighters were rapidly
spreading beyond the tribal areas and that, without "swift and
decisive action," the growing militancy could engulf the rest of the
country, Daily Times reported. The report prepared by the Interior
Ministry said that security forces in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
were outgunned and outnumbered and had forfeited authority to the Taliban
and their allies. "The ongoing spell of active Taliban resistance has
brought about serious repercussions for Pakistan… There is a general
policy of appeasement towards the Taliban, which has further emboldened
them," the 15-page document stated. This report was taken up at the
June 4, 2007, meeting of the National Security Council in General
Musharraf’s presence. An unnamed Western diplomat called the document
"an accurate description of the dagger pointed at the country’s
heart… It’s tragic it’s taken so long to recognise it." Daily
Times, July 1, 2007.
Suicide
bombers holed up in Lal Masjid, says President Pervez Musharraf:
President Pervez Musharraf said on June 29, 2007, that an operation could
be launched against the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa brigade, but a raid
would lead to heavy casualties on both sides because a large number of
suicide bombers were inside the mosque and seminaries. Speaking to the
media at the National Defence University in Islamabad, General Musharraf
said: "Can you guarantee that blood of any dead or injured will not
be screened on television channels during the operation?" He informed
that militants having links with the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and al Qaeda
were hiding in the mosque and seminaries and they had explosives. They
might cause havoc in case of an armed operation, he said, adding:
"Critics should understand that the Madrassa houses 2,500 women
students with minor boys, and suicide bombers inside are equipped with
sophisticated arms. While police are not capable of launching such a
complex operation, the Army cannot be involved for it can give a wrong
message to the world." He also observed, "We have involved
senior clerics of the country, the Council of Islamic Ideology and the
Imam-e-Kaaba to end the standoff. Shall we now call Allah to help these
elements shun their wrongdoings?" Dawn,
June 30, 2007.
[Source:
South Asian Intelligence Review]

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